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    <title>topic Re: We are currently using Azure AD for the authentication for CyberArk. We have a local authentication (break the glass) in case of emergency, can we remove MFA from that account (currently OTP by email). in Workforce Identity Discussions</title>
    <link>https://live.paloaltonetworks.com/t5/workforce-identity-discussions/we-are-currently-using-azure-ad-for-the-authentication-for/m-p/1330497#M380</link>
    <description>&lt;P&gt;One way to approach this would be to onboard your break-the-glass account to PAM, assuming you have CPM/PSM also. &lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;I envision primary user MFA to include something other than email; for example, setting up mobile app push to Identity, using SMS, or configuring an OTP token like Microsoft Authenticator. This will allow users to get to PAM even if internal email is down.&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;From there, users would authenticate with MFA, get access to your PAM instance, and request access to the break-the-glass account (either password retrieval, which would be less secure, or a PSM session back into Identity/PAM using the break-the-glass account. CyberArk has a connection component for Identity Administration that could be used in this scenario. This account could be secured with 'request access required' and/or exclusive access/OTP in PAM to enforce access control.&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;I always suggest keeping some portion of the break-glass plan offline; that is, keeping at least one account stored in something like a physical safe with two-person control, for instance. &lt;/P&gt;</description>
    <pubDate>Fri, 29 Sep 2023 14:18:44 GMT</pubDate>
    <dc:creator>CyberArkAlumni</dc:creator>
    <dc:date>2023-09-29T14:18:44Z</dc:date>
    <item>
      <title>We are currently using Azure AD for the authentication for CyberArk. We have a local authentication (break the glass) in case of emergency, can we remove MFA from that account (currently OTP by email).</title>
      <link>https://live.paloaltonetworks.com/t5/workforce-identity-discussions/we-are-currently-using-azure-ad-for-the-authentication-for/m-p/1330496#M379</link>
      <description>&lt;P&gt;This does not sound secure but in our disaster scenario (IdP is down therefore our emails are not accessible), do you have a good idea to secure the break the glass account?&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;Thanks!&lt;/P&gt;</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 28 Sep 2023 18:33:35 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://live.paloaltonetworks.com/t5/workforce-identity-discussions/we-are-currently-using-azure-ad-for-the-authentication-for/m-p/1330496#M379</guid>
      <dc:creator>GuyP</dc:creator>
      <dc:date>2023-09-28T18:33:35Z</dc:date>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Re: We are currently using Azure AD for the authentication for CyberArk. We have a local authentication (break the glass) in case of emergency, can we remove MFA from that account (currently OTP by email).</title>
      <link>https://live.paloaltonetworks.com/t5/workforce-identity-discussions/we-are-currently-using-azure-ad-for-the-authentication-for/m-p/1330497#M380</link>
      <description>&lt;P&gt;One way to approach this would be to onboard your break-the-glass account to PAM, assuming you have CPM/PSM also. &lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;I envision primary user MFA to include something other than email; for example, setting up mobile app push to Identity, using SMS, or configuring an OTP token like Microsoft Authenticator. This will allow users to get to PAM even if internal email is down.&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;From there, users would authenticate with MFA, get access to your PAM instance, and request access to the break-the-glass account (either password retrieval, which would be less secure, or a PSM session back into Identity/PAM using the break-the-glass account. CyberArk has a connection component for Identity Administration that could be used in this scenario. This account could be secured with 'request access required' and/or exclusive access/OTP in PAM to enforce access control.&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;I always suggest keeping some portion of the break-glass plan offline; that is, keeping at least one account stored in something like a physical safe with two-person control, for instance. &lt;/P&gt;</description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 29 Sep 2023 14:18:44 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://live.paloaltonetworks.com/t5/workforce-identity-discussions/we-are-currently-using-azure-ad-for-the-authentication-for/m-p/1330497#M380</guid>
      <dc:creator>CyberArkAlumni</dc:creator>
      <dc:date>2023-09-29T14:18:44Z</dc:date>
    </item>
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