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    Introduction Security administrators can use Google Cloud IAM to control who can access resources within a Google Cloud organization.  However, companies  may require the ability to restrict access to resources and APIs that reside in different Google Cloud organizations.  The combination of Palo Alto Networks URL filtering and Google Cloud organization restrictions , enables security teams to restrict employee access to sanctioned Google Cloud organizations.  The capability provides a variety of security benefits including, preventing insider attacks and also stopping data exfiltration.    Use-Cases There are many use-cases for organization restrictions, for example:    In combination with Palo Alto Networks URL Filtering, you can monitor and control sites users can access, prevent phishing attacks by controlling the sites to which users can submit valid corporate credentials, and enforce safe search for search engines like Google. You can restrict access so employees can only access resources in your Google Cloud organization and not other organizations. You can allow your employees read-only access to any Cloud Storage resources , but restrict all other types of access to only resources in your Google Cloud Organization. You can allow your employees to access a vendor Google Cloud organization in addition to your Google Cloud organization.   How it works The diagram below shows the required components to enforce organization restrictions.  When a managed device accesses a Google Cloud resource, the URL Filtering profile defined within the security policy, inserts the value for the organization restrictions header,  X-Goog-Allowed-Resources .      Managed device : Any device that adheres to the organizational policies of the company and is connected to, or routed through, a Palo Alto Networks enforcement point with URL Filtering enabled.  For example, the managed device can be a remote user connected with GlobalProtect, a datacenter server protected by a PA-Series NGFW, or cloud resources protected by VM-Series NGFW.  Palo Alto Networks URL Filtering : A URL Filtering profile is created and attached to the security policy.  The profile inserts the organization restriction as a custom header for any requests originating from the managed device.  This configuration prevents users and devices from accessing any Google Cloud resources that reside in unsanctioned Google Cloud organizations.   Google Cloud : The organization restrictions feature in Google Cloud inspects all requests for organization restrictions header, and allows or denies the requests based on the organization being accessed.   Example Scenario The network security administrator of Organization A , wants to allow employee access to resources hosted in their Google Cloud organization.  All employee access to cloud resources hosted in all other Google Cloud organizations should be denied.    Configuration A cloud and network security administrator for Organization A perform the following steps to implement organization restrictions.   Retrieve the Google Cloud organization ID for Organization A . gcloud organizations list (output) DISPLAY_NAME: Organization A ID: 0123456 DIRECTORY_CUSTOMER_ID: a1b2c3d4 Create a JSON representation for the value that will be assigned to the organization restriction header,  X-Goog-Allowed-Resources , and save it to a file named authorized_orgs.json .   Please see configure organization restrictions for complete information on constructing the value for the header. { "resources": ["organizations/0123456"], "options": "strict" } Encode the header value in base64 format.  Below is an example using  basenc .   The URL Filtering profile will insert the base64 string as the value for the X-Goog-Allowed-Resources header. cat authorized_orgs.json | basenc --base64url -w0 (output) fdsasdfInJlc291cmNlasjdfaJnYW5pemF0ay8xMjM0NTY3ODkiXSwKICJvcHRpb25zIjogInN0cmljdCIKfQo​ If there are no upstream devices decrypting HTTPS traffic, configure SSL Forward Proxy.  On the Palo Alto Networks device, edit or create a URL Filtering profile .  In the profile, click HTTP Header Insertion → Add to create a new entry.  Configure the entry as follows: Header : X-Goog-Allowed-Resources Value : Add the base64 encoded value from the previous step. Apply the URL Filtering profile to your security policy that inspects the managed device’s internet traffic. Commit the changes. Verify Configuration The organization restrictions are applied for access to the Google Cloud APIs and Google Cloud console. On a managed device that has access to both Organization A and Organization B , perform the following to test the organization restrictions feature.    On the managed device, log into the Google Cloud Console with an account that has access to Organization A and Organization B . In the Console, click the Organization drop down menu.     Even though the user account on the managed device has access to Organization A and Organization B , only Organization A appears in the Google Cloud Console.  This is because the URL Filtering profile inserts the organization restriction header to enable Google Cloud to block the user from accessing other organizations. From the same managed device, attempt to reach the logging API of a Google Project (i.e. org-a-project ) that belongs to Organization A .   The request should show a successful return of the log entries within the Google Cloud project belonging to Organization A . TOKEN=$(gcloud auth print-access-token) curl -X POST -d '{"projectIds": ["org-a-project"]}' -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -H "Authorization: Bearer ${TOKEN}" "https://logging.googleapis.com/v2/entries:list" (output) { [ <..redacted..> ] nextPageToken": "EAB<..redacted..>RsAB" } Attempt to reach the logging API of a Google Cloud project (i.e. org-b-project) that does not belong to Organization A .   The request should show a failed return to the Google Cloud project that does not belong to Organization A .  This is because the URL filtering profile inserted the organization restriction header into the request of the managed device. curl -X POST -d '{"projectIds": ["org-b-project"]}' -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -H "Authorization: Bearer ${TOKEN}" "https://logging.googleapis.com/v2/entries:list" (output) { "error": { "code": 403, "message": "Access denied by organization restriction. Please contact your administrator for additional information.", "status": "PERMISSION_DENIED", "details": [{ "@type": "type.googleapis.com/google.rpc.ErrorInfo", "reason": "ORG_RESTRICTION_VIOLATION", "domain": "googleapis.com", "metadata": { "consumer": "projects/01234567890", "service": "logging.googleapis.com" } }] } }   Additional Materials Google Cloud: Introduction to organization restrictions Google Cloud: Configure organization restrictions Palo Alto Networks: HTTP Header Insertion Palo Alto Networks: Create Custom HTTP Header Insertion Entries ... View more

    Introduction Palo Alto Networks VM-Series Next-Generation Firewall for Google Cloud is the industry-leading virtualized firewall to protect applications and data with next-generation security features that deliver superior visibility, precise control, and threat prevention at the application level.   Google Cloud internal TCP/UDP Load Balancing enables end-users to run and scale VM-Series deployments behind a single internal IP address. The VM-Series can be deployed in zonally dispersed managed instance groups to scale up and down based PAN-OS metrics delivered to Google Cloud StackDriver.  Traffic from the VPC network can be routed to the load balanced firewalls by creating a custom static route that uses the internal TCP/UDP load balancer as the next hop.  Here are some of the benefits of using TCP/UDP load balancing as next hop in your VPC network:    Load balance traffic across VM-Series firewalls to protect applications and data with next-generation security features at scale.   Leverage Google Cloud managed instance groups to horizontally scale VM-Series firewalls across regions and zones.  Enable Symmetric Hashing to maintain original client IP address. Provide high availability with reliable failover through cloud load balancer health checks.    Symmetric Hashing   Overview Historically, source network address translation, or SNAT, has to be applied when routing east-west traffic through load balanced VM-Series firewalls. SNAT can be avoided by either removing the load balancer or by configuring the load balancer’s backend service to use a primary and failover instance group.  However, implementing either of these workarounds limits your ability to effectively scale firewalls for your east-west traffic flows.  Google Cloud announced general availability of an internal TCP/UDP load balancer feature called symmetric hashing.  Symmetric hashing maps a given traffic flow to a VM-Series firewall while ignoring the directionality of the IP addresses and ports.  This capability ensures server response traffic traverses through the same VM-Series firewall that received the initial client request without proxying or obscuring the initial client IP address.  Symmetric hashing can be enabled on your internal TCP/UDP load balancer as long as the following statements are true:   The forwarding rule for the internal TCP/UDP load balancer was created on or after June 22, 2021. The custom static route referencing the forwarding rule was created on or after June 22, 2021. The internal TCP/UDP load balancer’s backend service does not use the NONE session affinity setting.   East-West Security with Network Peering  In this model, you can deploy compute resources in the same project as the VM-Series firewall, or distribute compute resources across multiple projects with unique VPC networks and administrative domains.  VPC Network Peering by Google Cloud enables you to centralize security by connecting spoke networks to a hub network that contains load balanced VM-Series firewalls.  Custom routes defined in the hub network use the VM-Series internal TCP/UDP load balancer as the next hop.  The routes can then be propagated to the spoke network’s route table via Network Peering's import/export custom route functionality.   If symmetric hashing is enabled on the internal TCP/UDP load balancer, the VM-Series can be deployed into managed instance groups to automatically scale based on utilization metrics.   Example 1. The hub network contains VM-Series firewalls deployed in a managed instance group that serve as the backend of an internal TCP/UDP load balancer with symmetric hashing enabled.  The hub network has a custom default route that uses the TCP/UDP load balancer as the next hop.  This route is propagated over the VPC peering connection (via import/export custom routes) to spoke1 and spoke2 VPC network’s route table.  Below is an example of how a request is routed and handled by the internal load balancer with symmetric hashing enabled.   Client Request A TCP request from SPOKE1-VM (10.1.0.2) to SPOKE2-VM (10.2.0.2) is routed to the hub VPC network peering connection via the imported default custom route from the hub VPC network. The custom default route in the hub network routes the request to the TCP/UDP load balancer forwarding rule.  The load balancer sends the request to any of the available VM-Series firewalls for inspection (availability dependent on load balancer health checks). After inspection, the VM-Series sends the request into the hub network where it is then routed to the spoke2 peering connection. Hub-and-Spoke with Symmetric Hashing - Client Request Traffic   Server Response The TCP response from SPOKE2-VM (10.2.0.2) to SPOKE1-VM (10.1.0.2) is routed to the hub VPC network peering connection via the imported default custom route from the hub VPC network. The custom default route in the hub network routes the response to the TCP/UDP load balancer forwarding rule. Symmetric hashing on the load balancer sends the response to the same VM-Series firewall that received the initial client request (without proxying or using source network address translation). The VM-Series sends the response into the hub’s network where it is routed to spoke1 peering connection and the session is established. Hub and Spoke with Symmetric Hashing - Server Response Traffic     Example 2. In this example, the VM-Series firewalls secure traffic between the production, development, and QA VPC networks.  Within each VPC, the VM-Series dataplane interfaces are the backend service of separate internal TCP/UDP load balancers; each of which have symmetric hashing enabled.  A custom default route is defined in the production VPC to use the production load balancer as the next hop.  Likewise, a custom default route is defined in the development VPC network to use the development load balancer as the next hop.  Even though the request and response traffic are sent through separate TCP/UDP load balancers, the VM-Series does not need to apply SNAT to maintain symmetry.  Symmetric hashing ensures packets that are a part of the same flow use the same firewall for a given session.  If desired, you can still apply SNAT, but it is not required.       Scale Security for Outbound Traffic for Global VPC Networks   VPC networks, including their associated routes and firewall rules, are global resources.  They are not associated with a particular region or zone.  The VPC network’s subnets determine regionality.  This provides organizations with the unique ability to have cloud resources deployed globally, while maintaining a small VPC network footprint with a centralized route domain and firewall rule set.  The VM-Series firewall with Google Cloud’s internal load balancer can handle egress requests from regions that are different from its own.  For example, if the VM-Series and internal load balancer are deployed in region1, requests from region2 and region3 can be routed to the region1 firewalls.  However, this may be undesirable due to cross region transaction costs, latency considerations, and cross-region resiliency requirements.    You could deploy load balanced VM-Series firewalls in regions that are reflective of your workload’s locations.  However, this design previously presented a design issue.  If two or more custom static routes with the same destination using different internal TCP/UDP load balancers as the next hop, the traffic could not be distributed among the load balancers using ECMP.   This limitation can be completely overcome by leveraging Google Cloud’s network tags.  Network tags make routes applicable only to instances that use the corresponding network tag and can be used for a variety of use-cases, including:    Prevention of cross-region traffic flows. Isolation of egress traffic between development environment and production environments. Creation of “swimming-lanes” to distribute traffic to different sets of load balanced firewalls.   Example 3. The diagram below is an example of how to use network tags to prevent cross region traffic flows for outbound internet requests.  The trust VPC route table has two default routes: default-east and default-west.  Each route has a unique network tag applied to it: vmseries-east and vmseries-west.    Although both routes belong to the VPC route table, the routes are only applied to compute resources that share the same network tag.    For example, the compute resources in the us-east subnets have the east-vmseries tag applied.  This ensures resources residing in us-east will only use the us-east VM-Series firewall set.  Likewise, compute resources in us-west have the west-vmseries network tag applied to force us-west traffic through the us-west VM-Series firewall set.    Network Tags for Internal Load Balancer as Next Hop   The end result with network tags is you do not need to segregate different client instances into separate VPC networks, each pointing to their preferred internal TCP/UDP load balancer front-ending a  set of VM-Series firewalls.  Below is an example architecture of using network tags to isolate regional subnet traffic flow through a set of firewalls that share the same region   More Information Google Cloud - Internal TCP/UDP Load Balancers as Next Hop  Google Cloud - Setting up Internal TCP/UDP Load Balancing for Third-Party Appliances Google Cloud - Internal TCP/UDP Load Balancing and Connected Networks Setup Palo Alto Networks VM-Series on Google Cloud  Terraform Build - Google Cloud VM-Series ILBnH with Network Tags    ... 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Running a VM-300 on PANOS-7.0.3   When attempt to make a commit (either through GUI or CLI), it hangs at 98%, and then fails.  The commit failure outputs the following:   Client sslvpn requesting last config in middle of commit/validate.   Aborting current commit/validate. Not really sure where to start with this one, any advice is much appreciated.     Thanks. ... View more

Hi all,   I understand that GlobalProtect uses TCP 443 and UDP 4501... But what is there any more information available about GlobalProtects usage of port 4501?  All I could find is the following:   TCP/443 for the SSL communication UDP/4501 for tunnel communication to the GlobalProtect Gateway It doesn't really include much about it.. any insight is much appreciated.   Thanks. ... View more

Hi all,   I have enabled VPNC for my Linux users who cannot use GlobalProtect.  Does VPNC use port 443 like globalprotect?  Can't seem to find any information about this on the web.   -Matt ... View more

Hi all,   Environment Overview: I have a 3 PA firewalls (connected in a hub-and-spoke fashion - 2 satellites, 1 portal.   All the client VPN traffic (VPNC for Linux, GlobalProtect for Windows) is routed from the satellites to the portal to a trusted network behind the portal.     Issue Experiencing: When a VPNC client (call it Client-A), connects to any firewall (call them PA-1, PA-2, PA-3), the connection works just fine.  When Client-A disconnects from PA-1and connects to PA-2, the connection works from the client side.   However, if you look at the GUI for PA-1, the connection for Client-A is still there even though Client-A is not connected to PA-1 anymore.   From the firewall perspective, it is as if Client-A is connected to PA-1 and PA-2 (but in reality is only connected to PA-2).  There have been instances where these "phantom connections" are on all three firewalls, but only one connection is a real VPNC connection.   Additional Points: - I have changed the timeout settings for the client on the firewall side, this did not fix the issue. - This is only specific to the Linux VPNC client, there are no problems with the GlobalProtect client for Windows.   I am really stumped on this one.  ANY insight to possible starting points is much appreciated.   ... View more