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Mapping Use Cases for Session Management
Effective privileged access management (PAM) is crucial for protecting sensitive information and maintaining the security of IT environments across all types: On-Prem, Hybrid, and Cloud. Proper management of privileged accounts helps mitigate the risk of unauthorized access, data breaches, and compliance issues in these environments. This document provides a comprehensive guide on best practices for managing privileged access across various systems and platforms. It includes detailed recommendations for leveraging solutions to secure access to Windows and Linux servers, databases, cloud services, and web applications, ensuring robust protection and compliance.
Consolidated Use Case Solutions. 6
This technical article is designed for those serving the function of Program Director, Security Architect, or Administrator roles. The article can be used by those responsible for the design and rollout of the solution, those responsible for maintaining the application layer of the Idira Identity Security solution, and those responsible for the overall Identity Security program.
This document discusses best practices for privileged access management, offering recommendations for various use cases, including domain accounts, local accounts, database administration, cloud administration, development, and web application administration. It advises using capabilities like Secure Infrastructure Access (SIA), Workforce Password Management (WPM), Secure Web Sessions (SWS), and Secure Cloud Access (SCA) to enhance security and reduce risks for privileged access.
The document emphasizes the importance of zero standing privilege and ephemeral credentials. It advocates removing standing access and using just-in-time provisioning or ephemeral credentials, such as SSH certificates, to grant access only when needed.
Additionally, it covers managing privileged access for different types of accounts (domain, local, built-in, and workforce) and platforms (Windows, Linux, databases, cloud service providers, and web applications).
Secure Infrastructure Access offers a non-intrusive, agentless SaaS solution designed to be used by the functions responsible for securing privileged access to organizational assets that may be distributed across multiple hybrid and cloud environments. Access may be with zero standing privileges (ZSP) or using vaulted credentials. The solution significantly reduces the risk of standing privileges access and includes session isolation and monitoring.
Users such as system administrators, DevOps engineers, application owners, and others get VPN-less secure access to Windows, Linux, databases and Kubernetes. They can connect natively to the required target using the client of their choice via an MFA-secured connection, with the right access for the required length of time.
For access with vaulted credentials from PAM, SIA utilizes the existing access control policies as defined with users' permissions on safes. Therefore, the only step that is required to start working is to deploy the SIA connector.
For securely accessing targets other than Windows, Linux, databases and Kubernetes, SIA co-exists with solutions such as Privileged Session Manager, Secure Web Sessions, Secure Cloud Access, and Identity Single-Sign-On which can provide access to cloud consoles, web applications, and fat clients..
Workforce Password Management (WPM) for Privileged Apps secures sessions for privileged accounts used in web applications. It allows organizations to connect to privileged web applications with vaulted credentials and leverages Secure Web Sessions (SWS) to record and monitor privileged users’ activity within web applications and cloud consoles. WPM for Privileged Apps can be used for SaaS-based business apps as well as self-hosted business apps. For the latter use case, the App Gateway is required.
Secure Cloud Access (SCA) provides secure and controlled access to cloud environments via browser or CLI, leveraging zero standing privilege (ZSP) and just-in-time (JIT) provisioning. SCA manages access to critical cloud resources, ensuring that users are granted access only when necessary and for the shortest time required. It helps protect cloud environments by minimizing standing access and reducing potential attack surfaces. Additionally, SCA leverages Secure Web Sessions (SWS) to provide comprehensive session audit capabilities, ensuring all access and actions are thoroughly monitored and recorded.
Privileged Session Manager (PSM) and Privileged Session Manager Proxy (PSMP) provide secure and monitored access to systems and applications. PSM and PSMP both provide secure connections to target systems using vaulted accounts. PSM supports web application connection components for browser-based access as well as thick client connection components for access to applications with native tools. PSMP is used for secure and monitored access to ssh-based target systems like *NIX servers and network devices. Both solutions isolate credentials and ensure that privileged sessions are tightly controlled and audited, maintaining a high level of security and accountability.
For existing elevated domain account access to Windows Servers via RDP, Linux servers via SSH, databases via CLI or thick client, or Kubernetes via CLI, use Secure Infrastructure Access (SIA) with vaulted accounts. This ensures that sensitive account credentials are securely stored and managed. For added security, configure access using zero standing privilege (ZSP) or ephemeral SSH certificates. This approach removes any standing access, reducing the risk of credential misuse or compromise.
When using ZSP for Windows servers, SIA can add the account to customer-defined local groups, ensuring the right privileges are assigned. This approach minimizes the risk associated with standing access. Additionally, Endpoint Privilege Management (EPM) can be added to provide even more granular control over the provisioned account’s privileges on the system, ensuring that users have only the access they need when they need it. For Linux server access via SSH, Endpoint Privilege Manager for Linux (EPM4L) can provision domain-based accounts upon login and authorize them in the OS using POSIX attributes.
For elevated domain account access to self-hosted business applications via thick clients like MMCs, use Privileged Session Manager (PSM) with a custom connection component. This ensures secure and monitored access to critical applications. Alternatively, consider a jump server setup with applications installed and provide access to it via SIA with vaulted accounts. This approach consolidates access points, further secures the environment, and allows you to reduce the footprint that PSM requires. If transitioning to a jump server setup is not feasible, PSM remains necessary to maintain isolated access and monitoring for Thick Clients.
For standard, “non-privileged”, or workforce domain account access to Windows Servers via RDP or Linux servers via SSH, use SIA with ephemeral accounts and remove those workforce accounts from the local privileged groups on the target system. This minimizes the risk of privilege escalation and maintains a higher security posture. Ephemeral accounts ensure that access is granted only when necessary, further reducing potential attack vectors.
For root account access to Linux servers via SSH, leverage Secure Infrastructure Access (SIA) with vaulted accounts. This ensures that the root account credentials are securely stored and rotated. For initial ingress to Linux servers where SSH is disabled for the root account, a logon account can be leveraged. For non-root, but elevated local account access to Linux servers via SSH, use SIA with ephemeral SSH certificates. This allows organizations to use their existing local elevated accounts, granting access via ephemeral SSH certificates instead of standing passwords. This method requires configuring existing privileged accounts to have no password and no SSH key configured to access the machine, ensuring access solely through SIA ephemeral certificates, thus enhancing security by preventing unauthorized access.
For existing privileged local user access to Windows servers via RDP including the built-in administrator or accounts added to the “Administrators” group, vault the accounts in Privilege Cloud and use SIA with vaulted accounts. This securely rotates and stores credentials, reducing the risk of compromise. Alternatively, utilize SIA for zero standing privilege (ZSP) and just-in-time (JIT) access on Windows systems. This eliminates the need for local secondary accounts on target systems, further minimizing potential attack vectors by ensuring that access is granted only when needed.
Currently, as of November 18th, 2024, SSH access to network devices is not supported by SIA. To that end, for existing local account access to network devices via SSH, use Privileged Session Manager Proxy (PSMP). This ensures secure and monitored access to network devices, maintaining a high level of security and accountability for all access activities.
For built-in local account access to databases via CLI or thick client, utilize Secure Infrastructure Access (SIA) with vaulted accounts. If additional elevated local accounts are configured to access databases via CLI or thick client, vault the accounts in Privilege Cloud and use SIA with vaulted accounts to connect to the target databases. As an even more secure alternative, configure SIA with zero standing privilege (ZSP) and just-in-time (JIT) access. This allows for the complete removal of those additional accounts' in databases, enhancing security by granting access only when necessary. In both scenarios, native tools can be used with SIA to connect to the target database, ensuring seamless integration with existing workflows.
If “non-privileged” or workforce accounts have been granted access to databases via CLI or thick client, opt for SIA with zero standing privilege/JIT and remove the standard user accounts from the privileged database roles. This minimizes the risk of privilege escalation and ensures that access is granted only when necessary, further securing the database environment.
For built-in AWS or GCP account access to Cloud Service Providers via browser or CLI, utilize Workforce Password Management (WPM) for privileged apps with a secondary root-access Vaulted Account. If credential isolation is critical, opt for Privileged Session Manager (PSM) with a web application connection component. This ensures secure and monitored access.
It's important to note that AWS Root and GCP Organizational Admin/Owner accounts cannot be 'assigned,' making the Secure Cloud Access (SCA) option inapplicable. Protect these built-in accounts using different methods. For instance, vault the accounts in Privilege Cloud and configure them with TOTP. Additionally, organizations may store them in a secure manner offline for break glass protection, ensuring access during emergencies.
The "Global Administrator" role in Entra ID (Azure AD) can be assigned by SCA, leveraging Zero Standing Privilege (ZSP) and just-in-time (JIT) access via browser or CLI. Unlike AWS and GCP, this role can be assigned when necessary. The best practice is to assign this role sparingly. Note that Azure requires at least one user with the Global Administrator role. Vaulting this account in Privilege Cloud is recommended for added security. For further break glass protection, store the account offline and ensure that access can be granted during emergencies.
For any additional IAM user access to Azure, AWS, or GCP Cloud Service Providers via CLI or Console, leverage Secure Cloud Access (SCA) with Zero Standing Privilege (ZSP) and just-in-time (JIT) access for all users. This approach dramatically reduces the attack surface by ensuring that no standing permissions are present and that entitlements are granted only when needed.
For break glass access, vault the built-in CSP accounts (AWS root, GCP Superuser) to ensure they are available if needed.
For access to the AWS, GCP, and Azure (including EntraID) management console and CLI, utilize Secure Cloud Access (SCA) to obtain necessary entitlements using a native, zero-standing privilege (ZSP) access model. This model can be utilized for day-to-day access using predefined policies that define what a user “typically” needs. In this model, these entitlements are added onto the user’s federated identity only when the user requests it and for a specific period of time (hours). At all other times, these entitlements are not assigned to the identity greatly reducing the attack surface. For ad hoc access (troubleshooting an incident for example) on-demand access can be used to obtain necessary entitlements only after following the appropriate workflow approval process.
For break glass access, vault the built-in CSP accounts (AWS root, global admin for azure, gcp superuser to ensure its available if needed. This also allows for proper management and auditing of these highly privileged credentials.
For existing elevated domain account administrative access to SaaS applications, self-hosted business applications, or self-hosted device web interfaces via browser, utilize Workforce Password Management (WPM) for Privileged Apps and connect using vaulted accounts. This ensures that credentials are securely managed and stored and sessions are recorded with Secure Web Sessions (SWS). If credential isolation is critical, opt for Privileged Session Manager (PSM) with a web application connection component. This provides secure, isolated, and monitored access, maintaining a high level of security.
For existing standard, non-privileged, or workforce domain non-administrative account access to SaaS or self-hosted business applications via browser, leverage Secure Web Sessions (SWS) with workforce accounts. This ensures thorough auditing and monitoring of access activities, providing a secure and accountable environment for non-administrative access.
Note that, for self-hosted use cases, the App Gateway is required.
|
Use Case |
Recommended Solution |
|
Elevated domain account access to Windows Servers via RDP |
SIA with vaulted accounts; consider zero standing privilege (ZSP). |
|
Elevated domain account access to Linux servers via SSH |
SIA with vaulted accounts; use ephemeral SSH certificates; EPM4L for domain-based accounts upon login |
|
Elevated domain account access to databases via CLI or thick client |
SIA with vaulted accounts; consider ZSP/JIT for additional security |
|
Elevated domain account access to Kubernetes via CLI |
SIA with vaulted accounts |
|
Elevated domain account access to self-hosted business applications via thick client |
PSM with a custom connection component or jump server setup with applications installed via SIA; otherwise PSM |
|
Standard/non-privileged/workforce domain account access to Windows Servers via RDP |
SIA with ephemeral accounts; remove workforce accounts from the administrator group |
|
Standard/non-privileged/workforce domain account access to Linux servers via SSH |
SIA using JIT with ssh certificates; remove workforce accounts from the administrator group |
|
Root account access to Linux servers via SSH |
SIA with vaulted accounts; use ephemeral SSH certificates for additional elevated access |
|
Privileged local user access to Windows servers via RDP |
SIA with vaulted accounts; consider ZSP/JIT to eliminate local secondary accounts |
|
Local account access to network devices via SSH |
PSMP with vaulted accounts |
|
Elevated local account access to Linux servers via SSH |
SIA with vaulted accounts; use PSM connection components for contractors without a user in Identity |
|
Built-in AWS or GCP account access to Cloud Service Providers via browser or CLI |
SCA with ZSP/JIT for all IAM user access; For break glass, vault and rotate the built-in/default account in PAM or store offline in a secure location; PSM if credential isolation is required. |
|
AWS Root or GCP Organizational Admin/Owner account access |
Vault the accounts in Privilege Cloud and configure with TOTP; consider storing outside the vault for break glass protection |
|
Azure Global Administrator role access |
SCA with ZSP/JIT; vault the account with permanent global admin privilege in Privilege Cloud; store outside the vault for additional break glass protection |
|
Developer, Cloud Ops, Workforce IAM user access to Azure, AWS, or GCP via CLI or Console |
SCA with ZSP/JIT; remove workforce accounts with standing access from the administrator roles in CSP |
|
Standard/non-privileged/workforce domain non-administrative access to SaaS/self-hosted business applications via browser |
SWS with workforce accounts |
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