Secure Infrastructure Access
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This video will provide a comprehensive guide on the installation and configuration of Secure Infrastructure Access from CyberArk. We will adhere to the standard procedures for installing the connector, setting up pools, utilizing various connection methods, and more. Steps
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Answer Overview   This document summarizes a discussion on how Kerberos authentication integrates with WinRM in a Windows domain environment, particularly in the context of Idira Secure Infrastructure Access (SIA). The focus is on using a privileged domain "strong account" to manage and delete ephemeral user profiles on target machines. Key issues include lingering local profiles after domain user deletion, potential Kerberos ticket failures, SPN misconfigurations, and troubleshooting steps via event logs and commands.   Key Concepts   Kerberos in WinRM Connections   WinRM (Windows Remote Management) uses Kerberos by default for secure authentication in domain setups via the "Negotiate" provider. Process: Client (e.g., Idira SIA) requests a Ticket-Granting Ticket (TGT) from the Domain Controller (KDC). Then, requests a Service Ticket for the target's WinRM service, identified by a Service Principal Name (SPN). Tickets are presented to the target machine, allowing secure access without sending credentials. In Idira SIA: Strong account (privileged domain account) connects via WinRM to target machines. Used to delete ephemeral user profiles (temporary accounts created for sessions). Ephemeral users: Domain-level (created under domain root) and local (profiles on target machines under C:\Users). Service Principal Name (SPN)   SPN: Unique identifier in Active Directory mapping a service (e.g., WinRM) to an account. Examples: HTTP/targetmachine.domain.com or WSMAN/targetmachine.domain.com. Registered to the machine account or service account running WinRM. Issues: Missing, duplicated, or mismatched SPNs cause Kerberos failures (e.g., "access denied" or "invalid token"). Strong Account Interaction   WinRM service on target runs as SYSTEM (tied to machine's domain identity). Strong account authenticates via Kerberos ticket for the target's SPN. Once connected, strong account needs local admin rights to delete profiles (e.g., using PowerShell commands like Remove-CimInstance for profiles). Issue Scenario: Domain ephemeral user deleted from Active Directory root. Local profile persists on target (e.g., due to permissions, locked files, or command failures). Common Issues   Kerberos Ticket Problems: Invalid/expired tickets, clock skew (>5 min time difference), or fallback to NTLM. Permissions: Strong account lacks local admin on target or privileges for profile deletion. Profile Cleanup Failures: Locked registry hives, open files, or SID mismatches after domain deletion. WinRM Config: Not set to use Negotiate (Kerberos). Troubleshooting Steps   Verify SPN and WinRM Config   Check SPN: setspn -Q HTTP/targetmachine.domain.com (queries if SPN exists and to which account it's tied). Add SPN if missing: setspn -S HTTP/targetmachine.domain.com domain\strongaccount. WinRM Config: winrm get winrm/config (ensure Authentication > Negotiate is enabled). Manual Test: Use PowerShell Invoke-Command -ComputerName targetmachine -ScriptBlock { Get-CimInstance -Class Win32_UserProfile | Where { $_.LocalPath -like "*ephemeraluser*" } | Remove-CimInstance } as the strong account. Enable and Check Auditing   Auditing may need enabling for detailed logs (not always on by default for all events). Check Policy: auditpol /get /category:* (look for "Logon" and "Account Logon" set to Success/Failure). Enable Logon Auditing: auditpol /set /subcategory:"Logon" /success:enable /failure:enable. Note: Use forward slashes (/) in auditpol commands, e.g., auditpol /set /subcategory:"Logon" /success:enable /failure:enable. Key Event IDs in Windows Event Logs   Inspect logs on the target machine via Event Viewer.   Security Log   4624: Successful logon (confirm Kerberos use and SPN). 4634: Logoff. 4672: Privileges assigned (check for deletion rights). 4771: Kerberos pre-authentication failed (credential/clock issues). 4768: Kerberos TGT granted. 4776: Credential validation (NTLM fallback). System Log   7045: Service installed/modified (WinRM changes). 10016: DCOM errors (WinRM/PowerShell issues). 7001/7002: Service Control Manager (WinRM start/stop). Application Log   1530: Profile unload/deletion failure (key for lingering profiles, e.g., "access denied" or locked). 1511: Couldn't find local profile. 1515: Profile unloading issue. Steps Overview   This document summarizes a discussion on how Kerberos authentication integrates with WinRM in a Windows domain environment, particularly in the context of Idira Secure Infrastructure Access (SIA). The focus is on using a privileged domain "strong account" to manage and delete ephemeral user profiles on target machines. Key issues include lingering local profiles after domain user deletion, potential Kerberos ticket failures, SPN misconfigurations, and troubleshooting steps via event logs and commands.   Key Concepts   Kerberos in WinRM Connections   WinRM (Windows Remote Management) uses Kerberos by default for secure authentication in domain setups via the "Negotiate" provider. Process: Client (e.g., Idira SIA) requests a Ticket-Granting Ticket (TGT) from the Domain Controller (KDC). Then, requests a Service Ticket for the target's WinRM service, identified by a Service Principal Name (SPN). Tickets are presented to the target machine, allowing secure access without sending credentials. In Idira SIA: Strong account (privileged domain account) connects via WinRM to target machines. Used to delete ephemeral user profiles (temporary accounts created for sessions). Ephemeral users: Domain-level (created under domain root) and local (profiles on target machines under C:\Users). Service Principal Name (SPN)   SPN: Unique identifier in Active Directory mapping a service (e.g., WinRM) to an account. Examples: HTTP/targetmachine.domain.com or WSMAN/targetmachine.domain.com. Registered to the machine account or service account running WinRM. Issues: Missing, duplicated, or mismatched SPNs cause Kerberos failures (e.g., "access denied" or "invalid token"). Strong Account Interaction   WinRM service on target runs as SYSTEM (tied to machine's domain identity). Strong account authenticates via Kerberos ticket for the target's SPN. Once connected, strong account needs local admin rights to delete profiles (e.g., using PowerShell commands like Remove-CimInstance for profiles). Issue Scenario: Domain ephemeral user deleted from Active Directory root. Local profile persists on target (e.g., due to permissions, locked files, or command failures). Common Issues   Kerberos Ticket Problems: Invalid/expired tickets, clock skew (>5 min time difference), or fallback to NTLM. Permissions: Strong account lacks local admin on target or privileges for profile deletion. Profile Cleanup Failures: Locked registry hives, open files, or SID mismatches after domain deletion. WinRM Config: Not set to use Negotiate (Kerberos). Troubleshooting Steps   Verify SPN and WinRM Config   Check SPN: setspn -Q HTTP/targetmachine.domain.com (queries if SPN exists and to which account it's tied). Add SPN if missing: setspn -S HTTP/targetmachine.domain.com domain\strongaccount. WinRM Config: winrm get winrm/config (ensure Authentication > Negotiate is enabled). Manual Test: Use PowerShell Invoke-Command -ComputerName targetmachine -ScriptBlock { Get-CimInstance -Class Win32_UserProfile | Where { $_.LocalPath -like "*ephemeraluser*" } | Remove-CimInstance } as the strong account. Enable and Check Auditing   Auditing may need enabling for detailed logs (not always on by default for all events). Check Policy: auditpol /get /category:* (look for "Logon" and "Account Logon" set to Success/Failure). Enable Logon Auditing: auditpol /set /subcategory:"Logon" /success:enable /failure:enable. Note: Use forward slashes (/) in auditpol commands, e.g., auditpol /set /subcategory:"Logon" /success:enable /failure:enable. Key Event IDs in Windows Event Logs   Inspect logs on the target machine via Event Viewer.   Security Log   4624: Successful logon (confirm Kerberos use and SPN). 4634: Logoff. 4672: Privileges assigned (check for deletion rights). 4771: Kerberos pre-authentication failed (credential/clock issues). 4768: Kerberos TGT granted. 4776: Credential validation (NTLM fallback). System Log   7045: Service installed/modified (WinRM changes). 10016: DCOM errors (WinRM/PowerShell issues). 7001/7002: Service Control Manager (WinRM start/stop). Application Log   1530: Profile unload/deletion failure (key for lingering profiles, e.g., "access denied" or locked). 1511: Couldn't find local profile. 1515: Profile unloading issue.
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The following document describes how to integrate SIA with a Self-Hosted Vault- Integrate with Secure Infrastructure Access   Under the following section 'Configure the PVWA to integrate with SIA' we are instructed to validate the end user's JWT token in Idira Identity for security best practices.   Below are the steps to find the exact information int he customer Identity ISPSS tenant so that they can be configured in PVWA.   Note 1- This feature is only supported in PVWA 14.4 and above. Note 2- The PVWA requires connectivity to the internet. Alternatively, configure a proxy that allows it that connection. Proxy can be configured at the last step. Steps Step 1 In PVWA go to: Administration> Configuration Options > Options > ExternalServices >  IdentitySIA. Note- If ExternalServices does not exist, right-click Configurations and select Add ExternalServices. Then right-click ExternalServices and select Add IdentitySIA.   Step 2 Open the Identity tenant in a new tab or browser window. In Identity go to: Waffle Button > Identity Administration > Apps & Widgets > Web Apps Select the built-in web app "Idira OIDC Trust App" and copy two values from the app configuration data-    From the Settings tab, copy the Application ID. It should be "__idaptive_cybr_user_oidc" From the Trust tab, copy the OpenID Connect metadata URL up to and including .cloud. It should be something like "https://abx1234.id.cyberark.cloud" Step 3 Go back to PVWA and set the following:   Parameter Value OptionalJWTValidation Yes IdentityAddress The address copied from the Identity web-appv (example- https://abx1234.id.cyberark.cloud) IdentityAppName The App ID copied from the Identity web-app (example- __idaptive_cybr_user_oidc)   If a proxy is used to connect the PVWA server to the internet, set the proxy configuration in the proxy parameters per the official document linked at the top of this article (UseProxy, ProxyHost, ProxyPort). Apply and save the configuration. Note- For testing phase only, you can set the parameter 'OptionalJWTVali)dation' to 'No' and JWT validation will be skipped.   Troubleshooting To trouble shoot this feature, first enable trace level debug in PVWA, this level of debug is not enabled from the PVWA Web UI, but from adding a key in the PVWA web.config, default path "C:\inetpub\wwwroot\PasswordVault\web.config" Edit the file and find the end of the AppSettings tag i.e. </appSettings> and add the following line above it:     <add key="FullDebugMode" value="yes" /> The save the file and perform an IISRESET from an administrator command prompt window. Example of web.config: Note- If testing against a load balanced environment, this must be done on all PVWA's in the pool that the session might go to. After adding this debug level, and repeating the test session, we will see a new file in the PVWA logs folder (Default path: C:\Windows\Temp\PVWA) labeled "CyberArk.FullDebug.log" Open this file and search for lines regarding JWT Token Validation.   For example the request below failed due to an incorrect application address (tenant address was entered instead of application URL): --- | PASWS001E Error occurred: Failed to send the request | CyberArk.PasswordVault.WebServices.Infra.Exceptions.SiaRequestException: Failed to send the request ---> System.Net.Http.HttpRequestException: An error occurred while sending the request. ---> System.Net.WebException: Unable to connect to the remote server ---> System.Net.Sockets.SocketException: A connection attempt failed because the connected party did not properly respond after a period of time, or established connection failed because connected host has failed to respond x.x.x.x:443 . . . at CyberArk.PasswordVault.WebServices.Infra.Filters.CloudServicesAuthorizationAttribute.ValidateJwtToken(HttpClient client, String url, Dictionary`2 requestContent) ---   Reminder: When troubleshooting is complete, do not forget to remove the debug level key from web.config and perform another IISRESET.
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Question What Is a Target Set?   Answer A Target Set in Idira SIA is a configuration grouping that defines and matches the properties of infrastructure targets—primarily Windows machines for RDP access, but applicable to other resources—to which secure, privileged access can be granted. From official Idira documentation (e.g., "Add and manage strong accounts for Windows targets" and "Use of target sets and connections in SIA"): In SIA, target set is the collective name for the following group of target properties: Domain — the target's domain (e.g., cyberark.com or cyberarklab.local). Target — the target's identifier. For on-premises targets: usually the FQDN (e.g., mail.cyberark.com); for cloud targets: instance ID, private IP, or public IP. Suffix — the target's DNS suffix if configured differently from the domain (e.g., suffix.com). A Target Set can include one, any two, or all three of these properties, providing flexible scoping: broad (e.g., entire domain via Domain only) or granular (e.g., specific server via Target FQDN). Key Usage: In Conjunction with Strong Account Onboarding and Management The term Target Set is primarily used in conjunction with a Strong Account during onboarding, configuration, and ongoing management. Strong accounts are the privileged credentials (vaulted in Privilege Cloud/SIA or PAM Self-Hosted, or stored directly in SIA) that enable access—either by retrieving secrets for sessions or by provisioning ephemeral (temporary) users for zero-standing-privileges (ZSP) flows. Target Sets are associated with (and scoped to) a specific Strong Account. This ensures SIA applies the correct strong account only to matching targets, enforcing policies and least privilege. This is done via the "Manage target set items" action in the SIA UI: Steps (from docs): In SIA, navigate to Strong accounts. The list of strong accounts displays in a table (showing name, domain, etc.). For the relevant strong account, click the More options button (ellipsis ⋮) on its row. Select Manage target set items (this opens the "Strong account target set" page for that account). On this page, you can: Search for existing target sets (by domain, suffix, or target). Add a new target set: Click Add a target set → In the popup, select Type (Domain, Target, or Suffix) from the dropdown → Enter the value → Toggle Certificate Validation (Enabled/Disabled) → Save (or Save and add another). Edit/delete existing items: Select one or more → Use actions like Delete, Enable validation, or Disable validation. Changes apply immediately to scope the strong account. This "Manage target set items" flow is the standard way to onboard or adjust Target Sets for a strong account—whether creating a new strong account (where you can add Target Sets during setup) or editing an existing one. Connector Pools: Target Identifiers and Networks (Sometimes Loosely Called "Target Sets") Connector pools define connectivity and routing (which connectors broker sessions to which targets). They do not officially use the term "Target Set" in current SIA documentation. Instead, they define target identifiers and/or networks to scope coverage. Connector Pools: Target Identifiers (added via "Add target identifier" in pool setup): Types: FQDN, Hostname, IP address, Network (CIDR/subnet), Cloud-specific (Instance ID, Private/Public IP, AWS Account/VPC/Subnet, Azure Subscription/Vnet/Subnet, Google Cloud Project/VPC/Subnet). Recommendation: Define multiple identifiers for flexible access (e.g., connect by FQDN, IP, or cloud ID). Networks (assigned to the pool): Broader scoping (e.g., entire subnet/VPC). When using a network, target identifiers are optional but can refine coverage. Key Rules: All connectors in a pool must have access to the same targets (same networks/identifiers) for consistent load balancing/high availability. SIA attempts parallel connections from matching pools/connectors; first success wins. Multiple pools can match the same target for redundancy.   * Important note on multiple wildcard domains: If you add multiple wildcard domain entries in target identifiers or networks (e.g., *.domain1.com and *.domain2.com) within the same connector pool (or across pools that overlap incorrectly), you may encounter intermittent failures with the error DPA_CREATE_TUNNEL_BACKEND_CONNECTOR_UNREACHABLE. This happens because SIA may select a connector pool that matches the wildcard pattern but whose connectors do not actually have network reachability to the resolved target (e.g., it picks the wrong domain's pool/connectors). Connections will sometimes succeed (when it picks the correct matching pool) and sometimes fail unpredictably. To avoid this, use separate connector pools for distinct domains/subnets, or avoid broad overlapping wildcards in the same pool—prefer specific networks/CIDRs or explicit FQDNs/IPs where possible. Key Differences Summary Aspect Target Sets (Strong Accounts) Target Identifiers / Networks (Connector Pools) Defined in Strong accounts section ("Manage target set items") Connector pools section (Add target identifier / Networks) Properties Domain, Target (FQDN/ID/IP), Suffix FQDN/Hostname/IP, Network (CIDR), Cloud IDs (Instance ID, VPC/Subnet, etc.) Purpose Credential scoping + ZSP/ephemeral provisioning Connectivity scoping + connector routing/load balancing Matching Level Credential/policy enforcement Network/reachability + parallel connection attempts Wildcard Support Limited (mainly Suffix, e.g., *.suffix.com) Yes (e.g., in networks or cloud scopes) Certificate Validation Per target set (Enabled/Disabled) Global or per-connection type (e.g., TLS for vaulted) When to Use When controlling which creds apply to targets When defining which connectors reach which environments     Matching and Full Flow Connectivity first: SIA resolves the target and matches against connector pool target identifiers/networks → Routes through qualifying connectors/pools. Credential/policy next: Matches target against strong account Target Sets → Applies strong account (vaulted creds or ZSP generation). If no connector pool matches → Connection fails (no reachability). If no Target Set matches → No allowed strong account → Access denied. Best Practices Use Target Sets narrowly on strong accounts for least-privilege credential scoping. Use target identifiers/networks broadly on connector pools for reliable routing (tag pools regionally, e.g., corp.example.com\AWS-us-east-1). For on-prem: Often network/CIDR + FQDN/IP identifiers. For cloud/ZSP: Include Instance ID + IPs for robust matching. Test: Use session diagnostics for mismatches.
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How the SIA Strong Account Enables Secure Access to PostgreSQL   Idira Secure Infrastructure Access (SIA) provides Zero Standing Privileges (ZSP) for PostgreSQL by dynamically creating and deleting temporary (ephemeral) database users for each session. This eliminates persistent privileged accounts and ensures every connection has exactly the least privilege required. The mechanism relies on two closely linked components:   The PostgreSQL Strong Account Role (Example: sia_strong) This is a privileged  role you would create directly inside PostgreSQL. It is not a user that people log in with — it is a backend credential that SIA uses automatically to perform administrative actions. Key privileges (minimum required): LOGIN — allows SIA to connect to PostgreSQL as this role. CREATEROLE — allows SIA to create new roles, grant permissions to them, and drop them. CONNECT on a system database (typically postgres) — allows SIA to execute the provisioning commands. This role never needs table-level access (SELECT, INSERT, etc.). It only manages roles (users). No end-user ever authenticates as sia_strong.   The Strong Account in Idira SIA This is a configuration object you create in the SIA portal (under Strong accounts → Databases). It is not a new user in PostgreSQL — it is simply a secure reference to the existing PostgreSQL role. Example SIA Strong account fields: Platform: PostgreSQL Secret name : SIA-postgDB_Target01_strong [user defined] Username: sia_strong [account created in PostgreSQL] Password: [the exact password from the PostgreSQL role] Database (optional): postgres Port (optional) DNS (optional) How They Work Together – The Full Session Flow   User requests access You (or another authorized user) click Connect to the PostgreSQL target in the Secure Access portal. SIA authenticates & authorizes SIA verifies your identity (ISPSS credentials, MFA) and checks the active recurring access policy for allowed privileges (e.g., read-only via weather_reader role). SIA retrieves the Strong account SIA looks up the configured Strong account entry for this target → gets the username sia_strong and password. SIA logs in to PostgreSQL as the strong account role Using the provided credentials, SIA connects to PostgreSQL as sia_strong (using the CONNECT privilege on postgres). Provisioning – Ephemeral user creation SIA uses the CREATEROLE privilege to: Create a temporary role: CREATE ROLE temp_ephemeral_abc123 WITH LOGIN PASSWORD 'temp-pass'; Grant the policy-defined roles: GRANT weather_reader TO temp_ephemeral_abc123; (Optional additional grants based on policy) Session proxy SIA proxies your connection. You now appear to PostgreSQL as the ephemeral user temp_ephemeral_abc123, with only the privileges granted (read-only in this case). Session cleanup When you disconnect (or session times out): SIA reconnects as sia_strong Runs DROP ROLE temp_ephemeral_abc123; No trace of the temporary user remains This entire process is fully audited in SIA session diagnostics. Steps Step 1: Create the Strong Account Role in PostgreSQL   Why this step is needed SIA needs a privileged PostgreSQL role to act as the "provisioner." This role logs in to PostgreSQL and uses its CREATEROLE privilege to create, configure, and delete temporary (ephemeral) users for each session. No end-user or AI agent ever logs in as this role — it exists only for SIA automation.   Open pgAdmin (or psql) and connect as a superuser (e.g., postgres or your admin user) to any database (preferably postgres or your main DB). Run the following script from the Query tool: SQL CREATE ROLE sia_strong WITH LOGIN PASSWORD 'ReplaceWithVeryStrongPasswordHere!2026'; ALTER ROLE sia_strong CREATEROLE; GRANT CONNECT ON DATABASE postgres TO sia_strong;   Replace the password with a strong, unique value. If your main/system database is not named postgres (e.g., postsgres), change the last line accordingly. Verify the role was created correctly: SQL SELECT     rolname,     rolcanlogin,     rolcreaterole,     rolsuper FROM pg_roles WHERE rolname = 'sia_strong'; Expected output: rolcanlogin = true  → can log in rolcreaterole = true → can create/drop roles (required for SIA ephemeral user provisioning) rolsuper = false → not superuser (good – least privilege)   Step 2: Add PostgreSQL Resource via Resource Management in SIA   Why this step is needed SIA must know about your PostgreSQL server/instance so it can apply policies, test connectivity, and route sessions through your connectors. Without onboarding, the target won't appear in policy wizards or Secure Access.   In the Idira portal, go to Resource management → Add resource → Database. In the Onboard a database instance wizard: Database: PostgreSQL Location: On premises Service: PostgreSQL Authentication method: Local user Database details: Database name: postsgres (or your actual DB name — optional) Port: 5432 Read and write address: target01.cyberarklab.local (or IP 192.168.142.132) Strong account details: Strong account name: SIA-postgDB_Target01_strong (select from dropdown) TLS Certificate: Leave disabled (until first tests are successful) Click Onboard. Expected result   Success message The target appears in Resource management → Databases with healthy status   Step 3: Add a Strong Account for PostgreSQL in SIA   Why this step is needed: This tells SIA which PostgreSQL credentials to use when provisioning ephemeral users for this target. It links the PostgreSQL role (sia_strong) to SIA securely.   Go to Strong accounts → Databases tab → Add a strong account Choose Stored in the SIA Service Fill in: Platform: PostgreSQL Secret name SIA-postgDB_Target01_strong Username: sia_strong Password: [the password from step 1] Address (optional): target01.cyberarklab.local Database (optional): postsgres Port (optional): 5432 Click Create Expected result Strong account appears in the list Status is normal (no errors) Step 4: Add an Access Policy in SIA   Why this step is needed: The policy defines who can access the database and what privileges the ephemeral users receive (e.g., read-only). Enabling ZSP triggers the use of your strong account to create/delete temporary users.   Go to Recurring access policies → Create policy Step 1: Details Policy name: e.g., "PostgreSQL DB Read-Only" Next Step 2: Assets Click +Add next to PostgreSQL Select your onboarded target (target01.cyberarklab.local / postsgres) Apply → Next Step 3: Access rules Rule name: e.g., "Read-Only Ephemeral" Members/Identities: Add yourself (search your name/email) Privileges/Roles: Enter  (the read-only role you created) Zero Standing Privileges: Enable (toggle ON) Session length: 2 hours max (default is fine) Idle timeout: 10 minutes Create rule → Activate policy Expected result Policy status: Active Target now visible in Secure Access for connection testing   Secure AI Agent Setup (PostgreSQL) in Claude Desktop   Step 1 Resister AI Agent Agent Name: Agent Type: Save and continue to connect Step 2 Copy the URL and credentials into your AI agent’s configuration   This setup will use the paid version of Claude Desktop. Only the paid version has access to MCP.   Step 3 Claude Settings>Connectors>Add custom connectors Copy the information from the Idira Connect AI agent’s window to Claude’s Add custom connector Figure 1 Idira Connect AI agent   Figure 2 Claude's Add customer connector     Click Connect on the custom connector Redirection to CyberArk’s Identity should come up. If it does not connect after a bit you might get the following error. Just try again in a min or so. If you have already authenticated with Idira Identity, it may take a bit for Claude to get the tools it needs from CyberArk’s MCP.   Once it makes the connection Claude will show the following message and the custom connector will now say Configure. Click on configure will show the configuration along with the tools it can use   You should now be able to open a new Claude chat window and ask it questions related to the database.    
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Question What are the Authentication setting in SIA and what do they mean? Answer Key Authentication Settings Configured in SIA → Manage Settings → Authentication: Setting Recommended / Example Description RDP file without a need to re-authenticate * see note On Allows generating the RDP file without re-authenticating to Identity if already logged in. Client IP enforcement for RDP files without a need to re-authenticate Off When Off, uses Identity Secure Zones (more flexible). MFA caching (RDP) On Enables a cached MFA token valid for the configured period. MFA caching period (RDP) 60 Minutes How long the cached token remains valid. Note:  RDP file without a need to re-authenticate When the setting is ON: If you are already logged into the SIA portal (you have an active session with Idira Identity on the Infrastructure page or Connection Guidance page), then: SIA will skip the Identity authentication prompt at the time of generating/downloading the RDP file. You do not have to enter your password or MFA again just to download the file. The system uses your existing browser session with Idira Identity to create the RDP file. The generated RDP file still contains a short-lived, single-use SSO token (alternate shell:s: /sso <token> /sso_type rdp_file). This token allows the first launch of that RDP file to usually succeed without an immediate Identity prompt within ~1 minute of generation. When the setting is OFF: Even if you are already logged into the SIA portal, you WILL be forced to re-authenticate to Idira Identity (password + MFA) before the RDP file can be generated and downloaded. Every time you want to create a new RDP file, you must go through the full Identity login again Official Behavior (ZSP): Each ZSP RDP file contains a short-lived, single-use SSO token. Reusing the file results in an SSO Token Authentication Error. Idira Support states: “Reusing an RDP file in this context is not supported functionality and is intentionally restricted by design.” Official Workaround (from Idira Documentation): If you want to save the generated RDP file for future use, delete the alternate shell:s: /sso ... /sso_type rdp_file line. After deletion, the file becomes reusable, but it will trigger Identity authentication on launch.   There is no  method to completely bypass Identity authentication (password + MFA) for ZSP RDP connections. The only mechanism that allows a connection without an immediate authentication prompt is the short-lived SSO token embedded in the original RDP file. Once that token is consumed or expires, re-authentication is required. _______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Vaulted Connections vs ZSP – RDP File Behavior Vaulted Credentials (also called Vaulted Access) work very differently from ZSP: Aspect Vaulted Credentials Zero Standing Privileges (ZSP) Authentication method Uses stored credentials from the Idira Vault Uses short-lived SSO token + ephemeral account RDP file reuse Fully supported Intentionally restricted SSO token in RDP file Not used Always included (single-use) Can save and reuse the same .rdp file? Yes – natively No (unless you remove the alternate shell line) MFA caching behavior Works well Works only partially with edited files Authentication on reuse Usually no prompt (if credentials are cached) Requires Identity authentication on every launch How Vaulted Connections Work with RDP Files When you generate an RDP file using Vaulted credentials, the file does not contain the alternate shell SSO token. Authentication is handled by the stored account in the Idira Vault. You can save the RDP file and reuse it multiple times without generating a new one. If MFA caching is enabled, you typically only authenticate once per caching period. The file behaves more like a traditional RDP file with stored credentials. Key Advantage: Vaulted connections give you the true reusable RDP file experience you originally wanted — double-click the same file repeatedly with minimal or no re-authentication.
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This guide outlines the steps to create and configure a strong account, CYBR-SA01, as a domain account in Active Directory (AD) for use with Idira Secure Infrastructure Access (SIA) to manage ephemeral users, such as UserID-sBmF2M9TUGYWzRV. The account is added to a security group, SIA-StrongAccountGroup, which is configured with permissions to create, delete, and manage user accounts, modify group membership, and delete user profile folders under C:\Users on target servers for session cleanup in the OU where the security group is stored, for example, OU=StrongAccounts,OU=SIA,OU=Users,DC=example,DC=com. Idira recommends using a domain account rather than a local account with the same name and password on all target machines, and the account must be a member of the local Administrators group on each target system, preferably managed via a Domain Group Policy Object (GPO), with a Local GPO used when needed. Steps Step 1: Create the Strong Account in Active Directory   Open Active Directory Users and Computers (ADUC): Launch ADUC on a domain controller or a machine with AD administrative tools. Navigate to the desired Organizational Unit (OU), for example, OU=StrongAccounts,OU=SIA,OU=Users,DC=example,DC=com. Create the Strong Account: Right-click the OU, select New > User. Enter CYBR-SA01 for Full name and User logon name, for example. Set a strong initial password and select Password never expires to prevent disruptions (ensure password rotation is managed by Idira Privilege Cloud CPM). The account will be created in the default Domain Users group with minimal permissions. This account will need to be added to a Safe in Idira SIA for secure management and password rotation. Click Next and Finish to create the domain account, CYBR-SA01. Secure the Account: Right-click CYBR-SA01, select Properties, and go to the Account tab. Check Account is sensitive and cannot be delegated to enhance security. Step 2: Add the Strong Account to a Safe   Add the Strong Account to a Safe: Log in to the Idira Privilege Cloud portal. Go to the Safes page, click Create Safe. Set the Safe name to SIA-StrongAccounts. Once created, select the SIA-StrongAccounts Safe, go to the Members tab, and click Add members. On the Select Safe members page, search for and select the DPA RDP Privilege Cloud Secrets Access role to enable retrieval of CYBR-SA01 during Dynamic Privileged Access (DPA) provisioning, then click Next. On the Set Safe permissions page, verify that Read only is selected for Permissions presets. Save the configuration. Step 3: Delegate Permissions in Active Directory   The strong account should be a domain user defined with only those permissions required to perform the following operations in the OU where the security group SIA-StrongAccountGroup is stored, for example, OU=StrongAccounts,OU=SIA,OU=Users,DC=example,DC=com, as defined in the SIA access policy: Create, delete, and manage user accounts Modify the membership of a group To perform profile cleanup at the end of the session, the account should also have sufficient permissions to delete folders under C:\Users on the target servers. The security group SIA-StrongAccountGroup will be the AD group used when setting up an ephemeral domain user policy. Create a Security Group and Add CYBR-SA01: In ADUC, navigate to an OU, for example, OU=StrongAccounts,OU=SIA,OU=Users,DC=example,DC=com. Right-click the OU, select New > Group, and name the group SIA-StrongAccountGroup. Set the group type to Security and scope to Domain local. Right-click SIA-StrongAccountGroup, select Properties, go to the Members tab, and click Add. Search for and add CYBR-SA01 to the group. Delegate Permissions for User and Group Management: Create, delete, and manage user accounts Modify the membership of a group In ADUC, right-click the OU where SIA-StrongAccountGroup is stored, for example, OU=StrongAccounts,OU=SIA,OU=Users,DC=example,DC=com. Select Delegate Control. Add SIA-StrongAccountGroup in the Users or Groups step. Delegate the following common tasks:                              Create, delete, and manage user accounts                              Modify the membership of a group Avoid granting unnecessary permissions beyond those required for user and group management. Grant Permissions for Profile Cleanup: Create or edit a Domain GPO linked to the OU where SIA-StrongAccountGroup is stored, for example, OU=StrongAccounts,OU=SIA,OU=Users,DC=example,DC=com. Navigate to Computer Configuration > Policies > Windows Settings > Security Settings > File System>Right Click Add C:\Users, assign SIA-StrongAccountGroup Full Control, and apply to This folder, subfolders, and files. On the target server, open Local Group Policy Editor (gpedit.msc). Navigate to Computer Configuration > Windows Settings > Security Settings > File System. Add C:\Users, assign SIA-StrongAccountGroup Full Control, and apply to This folder, subfolders, and files. On each target server, grant SIA-StrongAccountGroup Full Control permissions on the C:\Users folder to allow deletion of user profile folders (e.g., C:\Users\UserID-sBmF2M9TUGYWzRV) at session end. To configure via Domain GPO: For non-domain-joined systems or when a Domain GPO cannot be applied, configure a Local GPO: Verify Permissions: In ADUC, right-click the OU where SIA-StrongAccountGroup is stored, for example, OU=StrongAccounts,OU=SIA,OU=Users,DC=example,DC=com, select Properties > Security tab. Click Advanced, locate SIA-StrongAccountGroup, and confirm it has Create User objects, Delete User objects, Read All Properties, and Write All Properties for User objects, and Write All Properties for Group objects. On a target server, right-click C:\Users, select Properties > Security tab, and confirm SIA-StrongAccountGroup has Full Control. Verify that CYBR-SA01 is a member of SIA-StrongAccountGroup in ADUC. Important Note: The security group configured in the SIA policy, SIA-StrongAccountGroup, determines the OU where ephemeral user accounts are created and removed. For example, if SIA-StrongAccountGroup is stored in OU=StrongAccounts,OU=SIA,OU=Users,DC=example,DC=com, ephemeral user accounts (e.g., UserID-sBmF2M9TUGYWzRV) will be created and removed within this OU. Step 4: Configure Group Policy for Minimal Permissions and Local Administrators Membership   Create a Domain Group Policy Object (GPO): Open Group Policy Management Console (GPMC). Right-click the OU where SIA-StrongAccountGroup is stored, for example, OU=StrongAccounts,OU=SIA,OU=Users,DC=example,DC=com, and select Create a GPO in this domain, and Link it here. Name the GPO,SIA-StrongAccount_LocalPermissions. Add CYBR-SA01 to Local Administrators Group: On the target server, open Local Group Policy Editor (gpedit.msc). Navigate to Computer Configuration > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Restricted Groups. Add the Administrators group and include CYBR-SA01 as a member. Edit the Domain GPO and navigate to Computer Configuration > Policies > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Restricted Groups. Right-click Restricted Groups, select Add Group, and add Administrators. In the Members section, add CYBR-SA01 to ensure it is a member of the local Administrators group on each target system in the OU. This is the recommended method for domain-joined systems, as it can be easily managed and aligns with common organizational capabilities. For non-domain-joined systems or when a Domain GPO cannot be applied, configure a Local GPO: Deny Logon Policies: Deny log on locally. Deny log on through Remote Desktop Services. Deny log on as a batch job. Deny log on as a service. On the target server, open Local Group Policy Editor (gpedit.msc). Navigate to Computer Configuration > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > User Rights Assignment. Add CYBR-SA01 to the same deny logon policies listed above. In the Domain GPO, navigate to Computer Configuration > Policies > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > User Rights Assignment. Add CYBR-SA01 to the following policies to restrict access and prevent abuse: For non-domain-joined systems or when a Domain GPO cannot be applied, configure a Local GPO: Apply the GPO: For the Domain GPO, link it to the OU where SIA-StrongAccountGroup is stored, for example, OU=StrongAccounts,OU=SIA,OU=Users,DC=example,DC=com. Run gpupdate /force on affected systems to apply the Domain GPO. For Local GPOs, apply changes on each target server by closing the Local Group Policy Editor or running gpupdate /force. Step 5: Configure the Strong Account in Idira SIA   Configure a Strong Account: Safe: SIA-StrongAccounts. Account name: CYBR-SA01. Domain: example.com. Enable creation of ephemeral domain users: Check this option to allow CYBR-SA01 to create ephemeral users like UserID-sBmF2M9TUGYWzRV. Ensure CYBR-SA01 belongs to the domain defined in the Domain field (example.com). Domain controller name (optional): Enter the hostname or FQDN of a writable domain controller (e.g., dc01.example.com). If an SIA Connector is installed, the connector will deduce the name, and this field is optional. Otherwise, this field is mandatory to ensure SIA can create ephemeral users. Domain NetBIOS (optional): Enter the domain NetBIOS name (e.g., EXAMPLE). If an SIA Connector is installed, the connector will deduce the name, and this field is optional. Otherwise, this field is mandatory. Enable LDAP Secure: Check this option to use LDAP Secure over TLS with port 636 for creating ephemeral users in Active Directory. Enable certificate validation: Do not check this option during initial setup, as certificate validation will be enabled later after testing the strong account and ephemeral user creation. Enable WinRM over HTTPS: Check this option to use WinRM over HTTPS with port 5986 for deleting ephemeral user profiles. Enable certificate validation: Do not check this option during initial setup, as certificate validation will be enabled later after testing the strong account and ephemeral user creation. Log in to the Idira SIA portal. Navigate to Strong accounts. Click Add a strong account. Select the strong account location: Domain account. Enter the following details: Click Add and continue to complete the account configuration. Ensure the DPA RDP Privilege Cloud Secrets Access role is assigned to the SIA-StrongAccounts Safe in Idira SIA (configured in Step 2). For PAM Self-Hosted environments, ensure the service user CyberarkSecureAccessService has List and Retrieve permissions to the SIA-StrongAccounts Safe. Step 6: Confirm the Configuration   Verify Account Existence in Active Directory: Open ADUC and navigate to an OU, for example, OU=StrongAccounts,OU=SIA,OU=Users,DC=example,DC=com. Confirm CYBR-SA01 exists with Password never expires and Account is sensitive and cannot be delegated enabled (Step 1.3). Check Delegated Permissions: In ADUC, right-click the OU where SIA-StrongAccountGroup is stored, for example, OU=StrongAccounts,OU=SIA,OU=Users,DC=example,DC=com, select Properties > Security tab. Click Advanced, locate SIA-StrongAccountGroup, and confirm it has Create User objects, Delete User objects, Read All Properties, and Write All Properties for User objects, and Write All Properties for Group objects. On a target server, right-click C:\Users, select Properties > Security tab, and confirm SIA-StrongAccountGroup has Full Control (via Domain or Local GPO). Verify that CYBR-SA01 is a member of SIA-StrongAccountGroup in ADUC. Confirm Group Policy Settings: For domain-joined systems in the OU where SIA-StrongAccountGroup is stored, for example, OU=StrongAccounts,OU=SIA,OU=Users,DC=example,DC=com, run gpresult /r to ensure the StrongAccount_LocalPermissions Domain GPO applies. Verify CYBR-SA01 is in the local Administrators group via Computer Management > Local Users and Groups > Groups. Confirm CYBR-SA01 is listed in Deny log on locally, Deny log on through Remote Desktop Services, Deny log on as a batch job, and Deny log on as a service policies. For non-domain-joined systems, open Local Group Policy Editor (gpedit.msc) on the target server and verify the same settings (Administrators group membership and deny logon policies) are applied via the Local GPO named StrongAccount_LocalPermissions. Test Safe Permissions in Idira SIA: Log in to the Idira SIA portal. Verify that CYBR-SA01 is listed as a member of the SIA-StrongAccounts Safe with the DPA RDP Privilege Cloud Secrets Access role and read only permissions. Confirm that you can successfully use Verify for the strong account in the SIA portal. Test in Idira SIA: Verify an SIA access policy has been created for the domain ephemeral and test using the Connection guidance page in the SIA portal. *Note:  Implement TLS Certificate Validation (Mandatory for Production): After confirming successful ephemeral user creation and profile cleanup without certificate validation Manage certificates: https://docs.cyberark.com/ispss-access/latest/en/content/hometileslps/dpa-crtfcts-lp.htm https://community.cyberark.com/s/article/SIA-Target-Validation-Error
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This document covers server-side TLS configuration only (what PostgreSQL needs to present a certificate to SIA). Steps 1. Required Files on the PostgreSQL Server File Purpose Required? Typical Name Format Permissions (both OS) server.crt Server certificate (public) Yes server.crt PEM Readable by postgres user server.key Server private key Yes server.key PEM 600 (owner read/write only) root.crt Trusted root/CA certs for client auth (optional) No root.crt PEM (concatenated) Readable by postgres user     2. Default Storage Locations Operating System Default Data Directory Typical SSL Files Location Windows C:\Program Files\PostgreSQL\<version>\data Same as data directory Linux /var/lib/pgsql/<version>/data (RHEL/CentOS) /var/lib/postgresql/<version>/main (Debian/Ubuntu) Same as data directory     To confirm exact data directory on any system: psql -U postgres -c "SHOW data_directory;" 3. Step-by-Step Configuration (Windows & Linux) Step 1: Generate or Obtain Certificates For testing/lab (both OS – run as root/postgres user on Linux, or admin on Windows): Bash   # Self-signed example (replace CN with your server's FQDN/IP) openssl req -new -x509 -days 365 -nodes -text \ -out server.crt \ -keyout server.key \ -subj "/CN=target01.cyberarklab.local" \ -addext "subjectAltName = DNS:target01.cyberarklab.local,IP:192.168.x.x"     For production: Use a certificate signed by a trusted CA (internal PKI or public CA) with correct CN/SAN. Step 2: Place Files in Data Directory Windows: Stop PostgreSQL service (Services.msc → postgresql-x64-<version> → Stop) Copy files to C:\Program Files\PostgreSQL\<version>\data\ server.crt server.key Set permissions on server.key: Right-click → Properties → Security Remove inheritance Grant Read & Execute only to the PostgreSQL service account (NETWORK SERVICE or custom) Deny to Everyone else Linux: Stop PostgreSQL service Bash   # RHEL/CentOS sudo systemctl stop postgresql-<version> # Debian/Ubuntu sudo systemctl stop postgresql     Copy files (as root or postgres user): Bash   sudo cp server.crt server.key /var/lib/pgsql/<version>/data/ # RHEL/CentOS sudo cp server.crt server.key /var/lib/postgresql/<version>/main/ # Debian/Ubuntu     Set ownership & permissions: Bash   sudo chown postgres:postgres /var/lib/pgsql/<version>/data/server.* sudo chmod 600 /var/lib/pgsql/<version>/data/server.key     Step 3: Edit postgresql.conf Open postgresql.conf in the data directory (use vi, nano, or Notepad++). Add/uncomment: conf   # Both Windows and Linux ssl = on # Required for TLS ssl_cert_file = 'server.crt' # Relative to data directory ssl_key_file = 'server.key' # Relative to data directory # Optional – client certificate verification (rare with SIA) # ssl_ca_file = 'root.crt' # ssl_crl_file = 'root.crl' # Recommended security settings (both OS) ssl_prefer_server_ciphers = on ssl_ciphers = 'HIGH:!aNULL'     Step 4: Update pg_hba.conf (Authentication Rules) In the same data directory, edit pg_hba.conf: conf   # Local admin/testing (both OS) hostssl all all 127.0.0.1/32 scram-sha-256 hostssl all all ::1/128 scram-sha-256 # Allow SIA proxy connections – replace with actual SIA connector IP range if known # For testing: allow all (tighten in production) hostssl all all 0.0.0.0/0 scram-sha-256 # or cert if client cert auth     hostssl forces TLS SIA proxy connects from cloud IPs — use host lines with appropriate CIDR if you know them Step 5: Restart PostgreSQL Windows: Services.msc → Start the PostgreSQL service Linux: Bash   # RHEL/CentOS sudo systemctl restart postgresql-<version> # Debian/Ubuntu sudo systemctl restart postgresql     Step 5: Test TLS Locally on the Server Both OS (run in terminal/Command Prompt): Bash   psql "host=localhost port=5432 dbname=postgres user=postgres sslmode=require"     Or in pgAdmin on the server: create a local server entry with sslmode=require. Step 6: Idira SIA Side (Strong Account / Target Verification) In Idira portal → Strong accounts → Databases → your strong account Go to Target set → edit target Under Certificate validation: Enable "Verify with certificate" Upload or select the root CA certificate (or full chain) that signs your PostgreSQL server.crt Do not upload server.key or the leaf server.crt — only the trusted root/CA Save and test connectivity from the portal (if available) Summary – Where Each Cert Lives Certificate Location / Storage Used By Purpose in SIA Flow Full chain (from portal) Client machine (your PC) – any folder pgAdmin / psql client Verify SIA proxy server.crt + server.key PostgreSQL server – data dir PostgreSQL server process Presented to SIA proxy Root/CA cert for strong acct Uploaded to Idira portal (TLS certificates page) SIA proxy / connector SIA verifies PostgreSQL server identity  
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Question Does SIA strictly mandate TLS/SSL encryption for RDP sessions and explicitly reject fallback attempts to use less secure RDP security layers? Answer Yes, SIA strictly requires enhanced RDP security, such as TLS, SSL, or CredSSP. The solution explicitly rejects legacy or native Windows RDP security layers that may be considered less secure.   Enhanced RDP security can be configured by the team within your company that handles administering Windows systems.
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Question If a user starts a SIA session, and multiple access policies apply to the session, how does SIA determine which one to enforce? Answer SIA will choose the access policy based on the following criteria, in order. If multiple access control policies provide the same value, the selection will move to the next criterion. 1. Maximum effective session length allowed Effective length is the actual​ time the user session can last. For example, if there’s a policy that allows 2h connection between 8am and 10am each day, but the current time is 9am, the maximum configured session length will be 2h, but the maximum effective session length will be 1h.   2. Maximum configured session length In case the maximum effective session length is the same, the policy with the longest maximum session allowed is chosen. 3. Maximum idle time length In case the above criteria return the same value, the policy with the longest idle time allowed is chosen.
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Question Does SIA Support Smart sizing configuration? Answer Yes, smart sizing works natively with SIA.  There are no configuration changes that need to be made as smart sizing is always enabled.  
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On your first SSH attempt, you might see: “ssh: handshake failed: unable to authenticate; attempted methods [none]; no supported methods remain.” This usually points to a problem with how the SSH key or certificate is set up. Because several issues can cause this, some investigation is needed to find the exact root. This guide walks you through a thorough troubleshooting process.  Steps Step 1 — Raise SSHD log verbosity  a. Open the SSH server config:      sudo vi /etc/ssh/sshd_config (or sudo nano /etc/ssh/sshd_config)  b. Find the LogLevel setting and change it to DEBUG3.  Tip: If there is no LogLevel line, add a new line that says LogLevel DEBUG3 (place it outside any Match blocks).    Step 2 — Validate and restart sshd  a. Validate the config syntax:      sudo sshd -t  b. Restart the service:      sudo systemctl restart sshd    Step 3 — Generate fresh log entries  From the client machine, initiate a new SSH connection to the target (a brand-new session). Let it complete or fail—this will produce detailed logs.    Step 4 — Collect the diagnostics bundle  On the target host, run the collection script (from this KB) with sudo:      sudo ./target_logs.sh    Result  The script creates an archive named target_logs.tar.gz containing the following files helpful for analysis:  host_info.txt  journalctl_sshd.txt  sshd_config  sshd_full_configuration.txt  Optional — Verify archive contents  tar -tzf target_logs.tar.gz    See a list of things to check, actions and resolutions:   Type of connection Parameter File Analysis Resolution Vaulted credentials Passwordauthentication sshd_full_configuration.txt   If you use password auth for vaulted-credential connections, make sure it’s set to yes.   Set Passwordauthentication to yes in sshd_config, then restart sshd. ZSP trustedusercakeys sshd_full_configuration.txt   Confirm it's not set to none and that it points to the current CA.pub file. If it's defined after Match User/Group blocks in sshd_config, it may not apply to all users. Move TrustedUserCAKeys key to the beginning of the sshd_config file (before Match Group/User definition) ZSP kexalgorithms sshd_full_configuration.txt   Ensure the list includes ssh-ed25519. If it’s missing, you may be running an older OpenSSH version or FIPS might be blocking it.  If the key does not exist, you may be using an old openSSH version that is not supported. Another option is that you have FIPS enabled and it blocks the usage of this key. ZSP SELinux support journalctl_sshd.txt   If SELinux is enabled, temporarily switch to permissive mode and test. If the connection succeeds, switch back to enforcing and restore the context on the CA file.  You can test via these commands:  journalctl -t setroubleshoot ausearch -m AVC -ts recent Restore the SE Linux security context for /etc/ssh/xxx_public_CA.pub file; Run: restorecon -v <absolute path to "SIA CA cert file"> ZSP, Vaulted credentials Other errors journalctl_sshd.txt Look for errors in debug3 mode that can explain the issue  
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The following PowerShell command performs a TNC (Test-NetConnection) check for ports 445, 135, and 3389 in one go. This helps quickly identify whether critical ports used by RPC, SMB, and RDP are reachable from the SIA connector server. This command must be run from all SIA connector servers, as port reachability can vary by connector due to network routing, firewall rules, or segmentation. Steps Step 1: Open PowerShell as Administrator Right-click on PowerShell Select "Run as Administrator" Step 2: Run One of the Following Commands Without Port 139 (recommended for modern environments): 135,445,3389 | % { "Port $_ -> " + (tnc TARGETSERVERFQDN -Port $_).TcpTestSucceeded } With Port 139 (for legacy SMB compatibility testing): 135,139,445,3389 | % { "Port $_ -> " + (tnc TARGETSERVERFQDN -Port $_).TcpTestSucceeded } Replace  **TARGETSERVERFQDN** with the actual fully qualified domain name (FQDN) of the target server. Purpose This command verifies if critical ports are reachable from the SIA connector server to the target machine. Port Purpose 135 RPC 139 SMB (legacy NetBIOS) 445 SMB (modern) 3389 RDP (connectivity testing)
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Configuring WinRM Secure for SIA Target Systems Steps Command:  winrm quickconfig -transport:https This command configures Windows Remote Management (WinRM) to use an HTTPS listener on port 5986 instead of the default HTTP listener on port 5985.  The actions taken are as follows: Starts the WinRM service and sets it to Automatic startup. Searches for a valid X.509 server certificate in the Local Machine’s Personal store (Cert:\LocalMachine\My) that: Has Server Authentication Enhanced Key Usage (EKU, OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1). Matches the server’s hostname/FQDN in the Common Name (CN) or Subject Alternative Name (SAN). Includes a private key. Creates an HTTPS listener bound to the certificate if found. Configures firewall rules to allow inbound traffic on port 5986. Limitations Fails if no valid certificate is found. May select an unintended certificate if multiple certificates are present. May not work consistently on older Windows versions or with misconfigured certificates.   Checking the Certificate Command:  winrm enumerate winrm/config/listener This command lists all configured WinRM listeners, including transport (HTTP/HTTPS) and certificate details (e.g., CertificateThumbprint).   Steps to Verify Certificate Copy the CertificateThumbprint from the command output. Open certlm.msc (Local Computer certificate store). Right-click “Certificate - Local Computer,” select “Find Certificate.” Paste the thumbprint and use SHA1 Hash to locate the certificate.   Certificate Requirements Must include Server Authentication Enhanced Key Usage (EKU, OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1). Common Name (CN) or Subject Alternative Name (SAN) must match the hostname or FQDN of the target system running the WinRM service.   Changing to a Different Certificate Get the New Thumbprint Retrieve the thumbprint of the new certificate using PowerShell: $newThumbprint = (Get-ChildItem Cert:\LocalMachine\My | Where-Object { $_.Subject -like "*server.example.com*" }).Thumbprint Alternatively, find it in certlm.msc (Local Machine > Personal > Certificates > Details > Thumbprint). Verify the certificate has a private key (in certlm.msc, check for “You have a private key” in the certificate properties). Remove the Old HTTPS Listener Delete the existing HTTPS listener: winrm delete winrm/config/Listener?Address=*+Transport=HTTPS Configure the New HTTPS Listener Create a new HTTPS listener with the new certificate: PowerShell winrm create winrm/config/Listener?Address=*+Transport=HTTPS @{Hostname=$hostname;CertificateThumbprint=$newThumbprint} $hostname = "server.example.com" $newThumbprint = "NEW_CERT_THUMBPRINT" # Replace with actual thumbprint Replace “server.example.com” with the server’s FQDN (matching the new certificate’s CN/SAN). Replace NEW_CERT_THUMBPRINT with the new thumbprint (no spaces). Verify the New Listener Test the configuration: Test-WSMan -ComputerName server.example.com -UseSSL -Authentication Default Successful Output: Returns an object with:   What does this mean? wsmid: Confirms the WS-Management identity schema, indicating the WinRM service is responding. ProtocolVersion: Shows the WS-Management protocol version supported. ProductVendor: Identifies Microsoft as the vendor (since WinRM is a Microsoft service). ProductVersion: Indicates the Windows OS version and WinRM stack version (e.g., 10.0.17763 corresponds to Windows Server 2019).
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Question When users log in via JIT, they receive the following message: Starting a new session (session ID: xxxxxxxx-6f53-411b-9fab-594xxxxxxxxx). Once started, the session expires after 480 minutes, or 0 minutes of idle time. Your session is being recorded. This indicates that users have up to 480 minutes (8 hours) of session time, with no idle timeout. Could you please clarify what happens if a user is running a script when the session reaches the 480-minute timeout? Will the script be allowed to complete, or will it be forcibly terminated when the session ends? Answer If the script is running interactively within the terminal, it will be terminated when the session ends after 480 minutes. However, if the script is started in a detached manner—such as using `nohup`—it will continue running in the background even after the session is disconnected.  Summary: Interactive scripts (run directly in the terminal): Stop when the session times out. Detached scripts ( nohup , screen , tmux ): Continue running even after the session ends.
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Issue Open Windows Defender Firewall with Advanced Security: Press Win + R, type wf.msc, and press Enter. Create a New Inbound Rule: In the left pane, click Inbound Rules. In the right pane, under Actions, click New Rule…. Configure the Rule: Rule Type: Select Custom and click Next. Program: Choose All programs (unless restricting to a specific application) and click Next. Protocol and Ports: Set the Protocol type (e.g., TCP or UDP). Specify the Local port (e.g., 3389 for RDP) and click Next. Scope: Under Which remote IP addresses does this rule apply to?, select These IP addresses. Click Add… and enter the IP addresses or IP ranges of the SIA connectors (e.g., 192.168.1.10, 192.168.1.20-192.168.1.30). Click OK, then Next. Action: Select Allow the connection and click Next. Profile: Check the profiles (Domain, Private, Public) that match your network environment and click Next. Name: Give the rule a descriptive name (e.g., "Allow SIA Connectors") and click Finish. Steps Steps to Allow Connections from Specific IP Addresses Open Windows Defender Firewall with Advanced Security: Press Win + R, type wf.msc, and press Enter. Create a New Inbound Rule: In the left pane, click Inbound Rules. In the right pane, under Actions, click New Rule…. Configure the Rule: Rule Type: Select Custom and click Next. Program: Choose All programs (unless restricting to a specific application) and click Next. Protocol and Ports: Set the Protocol type (e.g., TCP or UDP). Specify the Local port (e.g., 3389 for RDP) and click Next. Scope: Under Which remote IP addresses does this rule apply to?, select These IP addresses. Click Add… and enter the IP addresses or IP ranges of the SIA connectors (e.g., 192.168.1.10, 192.168.1.20-192.168.1.30). Click OK, then Next. Action: Select Allow the connection and click Next. Profile: Check the profiles (Domain, Private, Public) that match your network environment and click Next. Name: Give the rule a descriptive name (e.g., "Allow SIA Connectors") and click Finish.
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Question In the DPA service, admin is unable to delete / remove / change any previous installation/config of the "On-premises" platform. Is this expected? It should be able to 'manage' this similar to AWS and Azure platforms. We should be able to have multiple on-premise platforms, or at least be able to REMOVE the latest platform. Answer At the time of writing, this behavior is expected. An Enhancement Request would be needed for it to be able to 'manage' similar to AWS and Azure platforms, or be able to have multiple on-premise platforms, or be able to remove the latest platform.
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If you are using Identity Security Platform (ISP) please follow the shared checklist to ensure you are fully prepared -  https://community.cyberark.com/s/article/CyberArk-SaaS-PAM-Pre-Implementation-Checklist    Attached to this KB is the Pre-Implementation Checklist for Secure Infrastructure Access.   The document provides you with the required prerequisite work and setup a customer needs to preform prior to an installation.   The attached document includes easy to use checkboxes and date pickers to simplify tracking of your completion. Steps   FILE IS IN ATTACHMENTS BELOW   If you do not see a file attached to this KB you need to Log In to the Customer Community first and then navigate to this KB again. Refreshing an old tab after logging in elsewhere will not work.
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In this video, we will be using Cloud Entitlements Manager to connect a GCP Workspace at the organization Level Steps In this video, we will be using Cloud Entitlements Manager to connect a GCP Workspace at the organization Level First, go to Setup and select Platform Management Under GCP, click connect and select New Organization and then click Connect Login to GCP as an administrator and Copy the Organization ID, which we will then paste into the Cloud Entitlements Manager console Next, we'll specify the log location which we can get from the GCP console. We will need to copy the Project ID which contains the dataset, and paste it into our Cloud Entitlements Manager console. Next, copy and paste the dataset name below the Project ID. If you do not have an existing dataset, you can alternatively have CEM create one for you. Next, open the link for the Google Cloud Shell. Make sure and check "trust" before confirming. While the Cloud Shell is loading, head back to the CEM page to copy the command to deploy the service and paste it into the shell window. Once the command completes, head back to the GCP console to copy the final value from the newly created cloud deployment. Open up cloud deployment manager and select the CEM deployment. Under Layout - Click view to display the final value and paste it in to the CEM configuration page Now its time to grant the proper permissions to the service account. Back in the Google Cloud console, Navigate to "IAM & Admin" and open up the service account pane. Locate the CEM service account and copy its email address for the next step. Login as an administrator to the google admin console at admin.google.com and navigate to admin roles. Click - Assign Admin - then assign service accounts - and paste the email address we copied in the last step. Once the service account has been added - Click - Assign Role. Navigate Back to the CEM page, and select - start discovery. The discovery can take some time for large organizations. Once the discovery completes, connect the desired organization or projects by clicking on the three dots and selecting "Connect" Once the connection scan is complete - navigate to the dashboard to see your newly connected workspaces. You may need to refresh the page. In this video, we will be using Cloud Entitlements Manager to connect a GCP Workspace at the organization Level First, go to Setup and select Platform Management Under GCP, click connect and select New Organization and then click Connect Login to GCP as an administrator and Copy the Organization ID, which we will then paste into the Cloud Entitlements Manager console Next, we'll specify the log location which we can get from the GCP console. We will need to copy the Project ID which contains the dataset, and paste it into our Cloud Entitlements Manager console. Next, copy and paste the dataset name below the Project ID. If you do not have an existing dataset, you can alternatively have CEM create one for you. Next, open the link for the Google Cloud Shell. Make sure and check "trust" before confirming. While the Cloud Shell is loading, head back to the CEM page to copy the command to deploy the service and paste it into the shell window. Once the command completes, head back to the GCP console to copy the final value from the newly created cloud deployment. Open up cloud deployment manager and select the CEM deployment. Under Layout - Click view to display the final value and paste it in to the CEM configuration page Now its time to grant the proper permissions to the service account. Back in the Google Cloud console, Navigate to "IAM & Admin" and open up the service account pane. Locate the CEM service account and copy its email address for the next step. Login as an administrator to the google admin console at admin.google.com and navigate to admin roles. Click - Assign Admin - then assign service accounts - and paste the email address we copied in the last step. Once the service account has been added - Click - Assign Role. Navigate Back to the CEM page, and select - start discovery. The discovery can take some time for large organizations. Once the discovery completes, connect the desired organization or projects by clicking on the three dots and selecting "Connect" Once the connection scan is complete - navigate to the dashboard to see your newly connected workspaces. You may need to refresh the page.
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