Securing the Windows Domain Admin and Server Admin Access with Foundational PAM Controls

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When you ask someone to think about IT, the quintessential response probably contains the words “Windows”, “Active Directory” and “Server”. There’s a reason for that, they’re incredibly popular technologies that organizations have been using for decades. Entire companies run on Windows and AD, and with that comes the need to properly secure these technologies. In this article, we'll cover why securing the Windows Domain Admins and Server Admins are important, what challenges surround this type of access, and how Idira can help with discovering, prioritizing, and securing the privileged accounts used.

Introduction
Whether they’re running in your data center, or on your cloud provider, you can likely find a large amount of VMs and bare metal servers running Windows Server OS in your company. Naturally so, most organizations have large Windows footprints, and with that comes the need to grant administrative access to those servers. Many different roles require administrative access to servers, IT Administrators, Application Support Teams, Developers to name a few. Organizations typically utilize active directory as the primary method of authentication for these Windows servers, as it’s common for the majority of them to be domain joined.


That leaves us with basically two classifications of administrators, those who can administer the domain, and those who can administer servers on the domain. Domain Admins are all powerful. Server Admins all powerful on the machines they administer but can even compromise Domain Admins if they’re not secured properly. The amount of people with access, combined with the amount of instances, leaves a large attack footprint for malicious actors to exploit.

Securing your Domain and Server Administrative access is considered “table stakes security” – whether you subscribe to NIST, CIS, SANS, or some other industry guidance, they’re all going to tell you that you must secure this access. Many regulatory bodies provide the same guidance as well, which is why these accounts are constantly popping up on audit findings.

The Challenge
To address and remediate the security risks, we must better understand why this access is commonly sought after and compromised. For starters, domain-based Windows Administrator accounts are highly privileged and can usually bypass other local layers of security on the host, making them a prime target for attackers. Domain Admins specifically are the most powerful accounts that exist within Windows infrastructure and can impact any domain-joined machine. Users are often granted admin access with their standard user login, rather than using a secondary account, creating a huge vertical movement and privilege escalation risk. To complete the trifecta of attack chain risks, admin access is often over-granted to a wide array of machines, creating an unnecessary risk of lateral movement. Even if an organization is using a secondary account, user’s passwords are often subject to common re-use, making them weaker and susceptible to attack.


To compound some of these issues, Windows infrastructure itself susceptible to pass-the-hash attacks. Meaning that unmanaged wide scope of influence Windows accounts are primary candidates for target because they leverage the NTLM protocol that enables pass-the-hash attacks (of which there is no singular cure for, it’s just how NTLM functions). To make matters worse, Windows servers play host to a variety of other privileged credential repositories, including business applications, CI/CD pipeline tools, automation services, domain admin services and more. For all these reasons, malicious actors continue to target Domain and Server Admin access.

The Solution
Idira addresses these challenges using proactive and reactive controls for these credentials while they’re at rest, in transit and in use. By adhering to the recommendations below, you’ll have gained control over, and visibility into, the human-interactive access to your Domain Administrator and Server Administrator accounts. We achieve this through foundational privileged access management controls using Idira Privileged Access Manager (Privilege Cloud or Self-Hosted).
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Figure 1: Solution Overview Diagram

To remediate the risk associated with these credentials, we’ll want to apply a combination of privileged access management controls, which we’ll split into controls that get applied to the account itself and those that get applied to the user leveraging the account. For the controls applied to the account itself, we’ll implement vaulting and credential rotation for each administrator account, regardless of if it’s a Domain Administrator or Server Administrator. We’ll want to apply automatic and periodic rotation of these credentials, assigning complex and unique passwords for each account. Shorter rotation intervals and the use of one-time password (OTP) functionality is highly recommended for Domain Administrators, and suggested for Server Administrators, as these controls will further mitigate risk of credential exposure by shortening the password’s effective time-to-live (TTL). It’s critical to apply OTP to Domain Administrator credentials because of their high-risk nature. In the event a password goes out of sync (e.g., Active Directory password and vaulted value don’t align), the use of automatic reconciliation will ensure that we maintain constant control over that account.

To better secure the act of leveraging this account to access a system, we’ll implement credential and session isolation via a bastion host (Privileged Session Manager) to prevent the credential from reaching the users workstation (helping address the risk of credential theft), to prevent the user from knowing the password, and to prevent any malware that may exist on the workstation from reaching the server. Server Administrators can continue using their preferred RDP clients (e.g., RDCM, Devolutions, etc.) for simple, native access to servers. With Idira controlling access to the session, we can audit and record it as well. This mitigates the risk of external malicious actors compromising the identity of the admin to abuse the account and the risk of malicious insiders by providing visibility, audit and recording of the administrator themselves, serving both as a deterrent for privilege abuse and a useful forensic tool.
It’s also important for us to limit the scope of influence, the number of machines the account can be used on. Domain Administrator accounts should only be used to administer the domain and domain controllers, they should not be used to administer servers. This is to help mitigate the risk of the pass-the-hash attacks mentioned earlier.

We want to limit access of our Server Administrators to as few machines as needed to perform their function or job duties. Not all Server Administrators are the same: True IT Administrators are different than Application Support Teams or Developers. For IT Administrators, restricting the number of machines they can access is more challenging since they need to administer all servers, but for Application Support Teams or Developers, they often need administrative access to the servers where their software or code runs and in cases like that, we should explicitly limit their access to only those machines. While it’s important to restrict access to machines within Active Directory itself, you can also use the Remote machine access feature in PAM to create a list of machines to restrict the access of a Domain-based account with server access. This is particularly helpful in limiting Domain Administrator accounts to only access Domain Controller machines even though they can theoretically add that themselves to another machine, PAM can prevent that account from accessing it.

Handling Primary Personal Accounts with Privileged Access
In the event that our users are leveraging their standard workforce account (e.g., the one they use to sign into their workstations, email, etc.) for privileged access, we cannot apply the controls mentioned above just yet. Why? Because applying these types of PAM controls is not feasible on a primary workforce account, you’d get stuck in this “PAM paradox” of vaulting and managing an account that you’d be signing into your PAM solution with. So, what do we do? The approach that best aligns with the controls described above is to create a new secondary account (e.g., a_jsmith) and give that account admin permissions to the servers the user needs to access or create a shared account(s) used for role-based access. In either case, you’ll want to manage those accounts with PAM as described above and remove admin access from the standard account.

When doing your discovery work (as outlined in the next section) keep an eye out for your organization’s naming convention for standard workforce user accounts, and whether or not those accounts have admin permissions on servers. That will be extremely helpful as you conduct your assessment and build your plan for remediation.

Discovery
Now that we know what controls we should be applying and why, it’s time to start discovering all the Windows Domain Administrator and Server Administrator credentials that exist within your organization. Unlike our Windows Server Local Admin discovery, checking your IT inventory system won’t be as helpful since this access is federated with a directory system – the target system is just a resource, a service provider (SP), whereas Active Directory acts as our Identity Provider (IdP).


To truly understand the scope of our domain-based privileged credentials, it will be important for us to retrieve information from both Active Directory itself and the systems the accounts have access to. However, doing this without some sort of scanning tool is extremely challenging as AD does not keep a record of which machines an account has access to. You need to scan each machine on the network to properly understand the scope of influence an account has, a critical step in properly prioritizing. To do this we can leverage a tool like CyberArk’s Discovery and Audit (DNA) standalone application. DNA will provide output that allows us to view all that detail, which is extremely helpful in building a plan of action to remediate the domain-based accounts across your organization. For more details on how to leverage Idira DNA, check out the article Discovering Your Privileged OS Accounts with DNA. Pay special attention to the “Analyzing the Data” section where we cover domain-based accounts.

Another method for discovering your Windows Domain and Server Admin accounts is using Idira PAM’s built-in Accounts Discovery feature. If you’re looking to develop a process to discover and onboard accounts simultaneously, Accounts Discovery can automatically identify new machines and based on the rules you define, onboard those accounts to your Idira PAM solution. If you’re looking to do any upfront analysis or prioritization planning, it’s recommended to use DNA first, and then begin to leverage Accounts Discovery on an ongoing basis.

Prioritization
Domain Administrators First
Domain Administrators are generally considered quick win use cases that are both a high priority and low-hanging fruit. This is one of the most high-risk use cases and rarely receives pushback from end-users as the stakes are so high with these accounts. It’s highly recommended to address your Domain Admins first prior to moving onto general Server Admin access, as outlined in the Idira Blueprint Rapid Risk Reduction Playbook.


From there, how can you prioritize the rest of your Server Administrator access?

Scope of Influence
One popular risk-based approach to prioritization is “scope of influence”. Scope of influence is defined as the amount (or percentage of the total number) of machine that’s an individual account has access to. Is it 10 machines, 10% of machines or 100% of machines? The rational for prioritizing higher scope of influence accounts is that accounts with access to a greater number of machines pose more risk to the organization than accounts with less access. Typically, that’s going to be true IT Administrators first, followed by other Line of Business type admin users like those Application Support Teams or Developers. The guidance provided in the discovery section above will be instrumental in determining scope of influence.


Audit Finding, Security Incident or Leadership Direction
While we would typically recommend taking that risk-based approach to prioritizing accounts, we understand that sometimes other circumstances will drive your decision making, whether it be audit and compliance, security incident or leadership direction. If one of these is driving your decision making, we advise comparing the security benefit of that prioritization over our recommended risk-based approach to make sure you’re aware of and comfortable with the trade-offs.


Line of Business (LoB), Application, Data Classification
Of course you could take an alternative approach to account or server prioritization too, focusing on particularly noteworthy, important, or risky line of business (LoB), application, or data classification tiers. Again, we advise comparing the security trade-offs in this scenario too.


Implementation
Step 1: Discover Accounts and Build the Plan

First and foremost, we need to discover all the built-in domain-based admin accounts on the organization’s Windows Servers and develop an onboarding and remediation plan per the guidance above. This can be completed with the Discovery and Audit Tool or via the Accounts Discovery feature. As part of that plan, we’ll need to determine the desired safe design and safe member structure to support an account access model. For more insight into designing safes and safe members, please review the Online Documentation and our article on Designing Access Controls for PAM.


Step 2: Install and Configure PAM
The second big step may be the most obvious, but we need to make sure that we’ve installed and configured our Privilege Cloud or Privileged Access Security solution per the Online Documentation. This will serve as the foundation for securing the domain-based administrator credentials. This step is listed second because the discovery and analysis mentioned above can be started and even completed independently of the PAM solution being up and running.


Step 3: Define Your Security Policy
A key aspect of implementing security controls is defining what our policy governing them will be. There are two “concepts” of security policy to cover here. The first is what your organization’s actual IT security and password policy states, and the other is what settings you configure within Idira PAM, both are often referred to as “policy”. The latter is referred to as platform settings. Your organization’s security policy should be able to answer questions like, how often will our passwords be rotated? How complex is our password policy? How often will we verify the passwords are accurate? Do our audit or compliance requirements mandate anything specific? If your organization has no specific security policy requirements, Idira recommends rotating domain-based Server Admin accounts every 30 days (7 days for access to highly sensitive servers and Domain Admins) using a password complexity of 30 characters (min recommendation 15) with two capital letters, two lower case letters, two numbers and two special characters. These accounts should be verified weekly and automatically reconciled to ensure they’re always accurate and functional. Domain Admin accounts should also have One-Time-Password (OTP) enabled to rotate the password after each time the account is used.


Step 4: Onboard Domain-Based Admin Accounts to PAM
Once your PAM solution is up and running and you’ve identified all your admin accounts, you’ll need to create the safes according to the plan you developed in step 1. Then you can begin to onboard them. This can be completed using the Accounts Discovery feature or by using the Idira Account Onboarding Utility to bulk onboard the accounts to PAM. To onboard a singular account manually, you can use the main web portal.


Step 5: Phased Approach to Enabling Controls
In some cases, you may be able to flip on all security controls overnight with minimal impact to end-users, however that’s generally not the case and doing so successfully depends on several factors. When the overall user base is generally more resistant to change, aren’t familiar with the particular type of control being implemented and/or tend to use the accounts being secured often in their daily job routines, the chances of successfully implementing these controls overnight decreases significantly, with breach remediation being one of the few exceptions. Idira recommends taking a phased approach in order to minimize user pushback and gain higher adoption rates in scenarios where the organization feels that their users aren’t ready for the changes being implemented.


There are two types of strategies that we can employ to help ensure a successful implementation. The first is one associated with people and process, while the other is focused more on technology. For more information about the strategies related to people and process, see our Change is Hard article. The strategy focusing on technology is outlined below and is intended to reduce the user pushback often associated with implementing new security controls.

Note: As these steps are reviewed, it’s important to keep in mind that the overall goal of this exercise is to not only prove out the functionality on a technical level, but also to create internal champions that can speak with others about how easy the workflow is to work with.
  1. The first step is to ensure all necessary users have access to the accounts that are to be secured. Once specific accounts are rotated during the testing process, we don’t want users to be unfamiliar with the way in which they can get access to those accounts.
  2. The second step is to begin testing credential rotation with a small subset of accounts to validate that account passwords are changing as expected, while also helping to ensure there aren’t any network or permission-related issues associated with the credential management controls.
  3. Once rotation is confirmed to be functioning correctly, enable session management (PSM) for a subset of users and accounts to test and validate that your session brokering capabilities work as expected. This can be done on the same set of accounts that were used during step 2, or they can be different accounts. This step also serves to confirm with your internal champions that the training and guidance you’ve provided is working as expected.
  4. In an ideal situation, the users who have been helping with testing have begun to see how simple this is going to be for them, which will make the final steps much easier. From here, the next step is to begin rolling out credential rotation to larger groups of accounts until all built-in admin accounts utilize a unique password.
  5. Once all accounts have been rotated, we’ll want to run a Privileged Accounts Compliance Status report to validate that these accounts have successfully changed their passwords. If any have failed, review and remediate the errors.
  6. After that, organizations should consider enforcing session isolation for all domain-based admin accounts, although this can be taken in a phased approach as well. Start by simply enabling the PSM functionality but hold off on disabling users’ ability to see the password itself until the users are comfortable with the concept and any issues resolved.
  7. Once users are at a reasonable acceptance level, Idira strongly recommends disabling the ability for users to view or copy the password outside of an approval process, such as submitting a dual-control request or using a ticketing system integration in order to validate a password checkout request. If users are allowed to check out the password in any scenario, Idira highly recommends enabling one-time password (OTP) functionality.
High-Risk, High-Priority Foundations
Securing your Domain Admins and Server Admin access are both considered high-stakes critical initiatives and foundational use cases for organizations implementing PAM controls. This is why they’re both included in early stages of the Idira Blueprint, along with Local Admin access. We hope the insight and guidance above helps address the risks associated with that administrative access.


Be sure to check out our articles on Designing Access Control for PAM and Discovering Your Privileged OS Accounts with DNA to get some deeper insight on those two key aspects of securing your Domain-Based Windows Server Admin and Domain Admin accounts. If you’re interested in additional Windows OS security articles, we suggest checking out our article on Securing the Windows Server Local Admin (SID 500)
 
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